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”O Homem depende do seu pensamento.”
-Mokiti Okada

Resumo
Os sistemas computacionais tornaram-se uma parte importante da nossa sociedade,
para ale´m de estarmos intrinsecamente ligados a eles, a maioria da informac¸a˜o que uti-
lizamos no nosso dia-a-dia esta´ no seu formato digital. Ao contra´rio de um documento
fı´sico, um documento digital esta´ exposto a uma maior variedade de ameac¸as, principal-
mente se estiver de alguma forma disponı´vel a` Internet. Informac¸a˜o e´ poder, por isso na˜o
e´ de admirar que algue´m, algures esteja a tentar rouba´-la, assim, e´ facto que os adversa´rios
ja´ operam neste novo mundo. Ladro˜es, terroristas e mesmo a ma´fia comec¸aram a utilizar
a internet como um meio para alcanc¸ar os seus fins. A ciberseguranc¸a tenta proteger a
informac¸a˜o e os sistemas contra estes e outros tipos de ameac¸as, utilizando anti-vı´rus,
firewalls ou detetores de intruso˜es, entre outros. Infelizmente as notı´cias continuam a
sair, milho˜es de euros roubados a bancos por via informa´tica, empresas saqueadas da sua
propriedade intelectual e governos envergonhados por os seus segredos serem expostos
ao mundo. A questa˜o coloca-se, porque e´ que os sistemas de seguranc¸a esta˜o a falhar?
Como esta´ o adversa´rio a ultrapassa´-los? A verdade hoje em dia e´ que os atacantes na˜o
so´ adquiriram talentos avanc¸ados na a´rea como tambe´m teˆm acesso a ferramentas extre-
mamente sofisticadas e va˜o fazer uso delas para serem bem-sucedidos nos seus objetivos,
sejam estes o roubo de informac¸a˜o, o objetivo mais comum e por isso o mais abordado
neste trabalho, seja o ataque a infraestruturas crı´ticas.
Advanced Persistent Threat(APT), ou ameac¸a avanc¸ada persistente, e´ um termo utili-
zado para caracterizar atacantes sofisticados, organizados e com recursos para concretizar
ataques informa´ticos. Inventado pela forc¸a ae´rea Americana em 2006, o termo era uma
forma de discutir intruso˜es informa´ticas com pessoal na˜o militar. Nas suas origens, a pa-
lavra Ameac¸a indica que o adversa´rio na˜o e´ um pedac¸o de co´digo automa´tico, ou seja,
o adversa´rio e´ humano e e´ este humano que controla parte do ataque e contribui para o
seu sucesso, avanc¸ada porque este humano e´ treinado e especializado na utilizac¸a˜o de
todo o espectro informa´tico de forma a melhor conseguir atingir o seu objectivo e per-
sistente, pois esse objectivo e´ formalmente definido, ou seja, o ataque so´ esta´ concluı´do
quando atingir o alvo em pleno. Infelizmente, o termo passou a ser utilizado para descre-
ver qualquer ataque informa´tico e a ter uma conotac¸a˜o extremamente comercial devido
aos sistemas anti-APT que invadiram o mercado pouco tempo depois do ataque sofrido
pela Google em 2010. Neste trabalho abordamos estes pressupostos, e explica-se o ver-
v
dadeiro significado do termo juntamente com uma forma mais cientı´fica, claramente mais
u´til do ponto das abordagens da engenharia. Nomeadamente, sugere-se uma visa˜o mais
abrangente da campanha de ataque, na˜o se focando apenas no software utilizado pelo
adversa´rio, mas tentando olhar para a campanha como um todo; equipas, organizac¸a˜o,
manutenc¸a˜o e orc¸amento, entre outros. Mostramos tambe´m porque estes ataques sa˜o di-
ferentes, relativamente a`s suas ta´cticas, te´cnicas e procedimentos, e porque merecem ser
distinguidos com a sua pro´pria designac¸a˜o e o seu pro´prio ciclo de vida. Para ale´m de
identificarmos va´rios ciclos de vida associados a`s APTs, o ciclo de vida mais utilizado
para caracterizar estas campanhas de ataque foi analisado em detalhe, desde as primeiras
etapas de reconhecimento ate´ a` conclusa˜o dos objectivos. Discute-se tambe´m a esseˆncia
de cada passo e porque sa˜o, ou na˜o, importantes. De seguida realiza-se uma ana´lise ao
tipo de atacante por tra´s destas campanhas, quem sa˜o, quais as suas histo´rias e objectivos.
Avalia-se tambe´m porque e´ que os mecanismos de defesa tradicionais continuam a ser
ultrapassados e na˜o conseguem acompanhar o passo ra´pido dos atacantes. Isto acontece
principalmente devido a` utilizac¸a˜o de listas do que e´ malicioso e o bloqueio apenas do
que se encontra nessa lista, chamado de black listing. Ainda que se tenha ja´ realizado
trabalho na a´rea de detecc¸a˜o de anomalias, mostra-se tambe´m o porqueˆ de esses sistemas
continuarem a na˜o ser suficientes, nomeadamente devido ao facto de definirem os seus
pressupostos base erroneamente.
Durante a realizac¸a˜o deste trabalho percebeu-se a falta de estatı´sticas que pudessem
responder a algumas questo˜es. E por isso foi realizado um estudo aos relato´rios dis-
ponı´veis relativos a este tipo de ataques e apresentados os resultados de uma forma sim-
ples, organizada e resumida. Este estudo veio ajudar a perceber quais os maiores objec-
tivos neste tipo de ataque, nomeadamente a espionagem e o roubo de informac¸a˜o confi-
dencial; quais os maiores vectores de ataque (sendo o e-mail o grande vencedor devido a`
facilidade de explorar o vector humano); quais as aplicac¸o˜es alvo e a utilizac¸a˜o, ou na˜o,
de vulnerabilidades desconhecidas. Esperamos que esta recolha de informac¸a˜o seja u´til
para trabalhos futuros ou para interessados no tema.
So´ depois de realizado este estudo foi possı´vel pensar em formas de contribuir para
a soluc¸a˜o do problema imposto pelas APTs. Uma distinc¸a˜o ficou clara, existe na˜o so´
a necessidade de detectar APTs, mas tambe´m a criticalidade da sua prevenc¸a˜o. A me-
lhor forma de na˜o ser vı´tima de infec¸a˜o e´ a aplicac¸a˜o de boas pra´ticas de seguranc¸a e,
neste caso, a formac¸a˜o de todo o pessoal relativamente ao seu papel na seguranc¸a geral
da organizac¸a˜o. Aborda-se tambe´m a importaˆncia da preparac¸a˜o; seguranc¸a na˜o e´ ape-
nas proteger-se dos atacantes, mas principalmente saber como recuperar. Relativamente a`
detec¸a˜o, foi realizado trabalho em duas vertentes, primeiramente e visto o trabalho ter sido
realizado em ambiente de empresa, foi elaborado um plano para um sistema capaz de de-
tectar campanhas de ataque que utilizassem o vetor de infec¸a˜o do e-mail, fazendo uso dos
sistemas ja´ desenvolvidos pela AnubisNetworks que, sendo uma empresa de seguranc¸a
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informa´tica com fortes ligac¸o˜es ao e-mail, tinha o conhecimento e as ferramentas ne-
cessa´rias para a concretizac¸a˜o do sistema. O sistema faz uso de uma caracterizac¸a˜o de
pessoas, chamado de people mapping, que visa a identificar os principais alvos dentro da
empresa e quem exibe maiores comportamentos de risco. Esta caracterizac¸a˜o possibilita
a criac¸a˜o de uma lista de pessoal priorita´rio, que teria o seu e-mail (caso tivesse anexos
ou enderec¸os) analisado em ambiente de sandbox. Este sistema acabou por na˜o ser cons-
truı´do e e´ apenas deixada aqui a sua esquematizac¸a˜o, sendo que fica lanc¸ado o desafio para
a sua realizac¸a˜o. De forma a contribuir na˜o so´ para a empresa, mas tambe´m para a co-
munidade cientı´fica de seguranc¸a, foi de seguida realizado trabalho de detec¸a˜o em va´rios
pontos de qualquer rede informa´tica seguindo os quatro principais passos na execuc¸a˜o
de uma campanha APT. Decidimos enta˜o utilizar um ciclo de vida composto por quatro
etapas, sendo elas, a fase de reconhecimento, a infec¸a˜o inicial, o controlo e o roubo de
informac¸a˜o. Neste modelo, procuraram-se possı´veis sistemas para a detec¸a˜o de eventos
relacionados com APTs nos treˆs principais pontos de qualquer rede: a Internet, a Intranet
e a ma´quina cliente. Ao analisar cada fase em cada ponto da rede, foi possı´vel perce-
ber realmente quais as principais a´reas de estudo e desenvolvimento para melhor detectar
APTs. Mais concretamente, concluiu-se que a internet seria o ponto ideal de detec¸a˜o
das fases de reconhecimento, a intranet para detetar controlo e roubo de informac¸a˜o e a
ma´quina cliente para detetar infec¸a˜o inicial. Concluı´-se o trabalho apresentando o nosso
ponto de vista relativamente ao futuro, isto e´, quem vai fazer uso das ta´ticas utilizadas
nas campanhas APT visto serem extremamente bem sucedidas, como va˜o os atacantes
adaptar-se aos novos mecanismos de defesa e quais os novos possı´veis vetores de infec¸a˜o.
Palavras-chave: APT, Advanced Persistent Threat, Definic¸a˜o, Prevenc¸a˜o, Detec¸a˜o,
Futuro
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Abstract
Computer systems have become a very important part of our society, most of the
information we use in our everyday lives is in its digital form, and since information
is power it only makes sense that someone, somewhere will try to steal it. Attackers are
adapting and now have access to highly sophisticated tools and expertise to conduct highly
targeted and very complex attack campaigns. Advanced Persistent Threat, or APT, is a
term coined by the United States Air Force around 2006 as a way to talk about classified
intrusions with uncleared personnel. It wrongly and quickly became the standard acronym
to describe every sort of attack. This work tries to demystify the problem of APTs, why
they are called as such, and what are the most common tactics, techniques and procedures.
It also discusses previously proposed life-cycles, profile the most common adversaries and
takes a look at why traditional defences will not stop them. A big problem encountered
while developing this work was the lack of statistics regarding APT attacks. One of the
big contributions here consists on the search for publicly available reports, its analysis,
and presentation of relevant information gathered in a summarised fashion. From the most
targeted applications to the most typical infection vector, insight is given on how and why
the adversaries conduct these attacks. Only after a clear understanding of the problem is
reached, prevention and detection schemes were discussed. Specifically, blueprints for a
system to be used by AnubisNetworks are presented, capable of detecting these attacks at
the e-mail level. It is based on sandboxing and people mapping, which is a way to better
understand people, one of the weakest links in security. The work is concluded by trying
to understand how the threat landscape will shape itself in upcoming years.
Keywords: APT, Advanced Persistent Threat, Definition, Detection, Prevention, Future
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Computer systems have become a very important part of our society, most of the in-
formation we use in our everyday lives is in its digital form, and since information is
power it only makes sense that someone, somewhere will try to steal it. Furthermore,
critical systems like power grids, telecommunication networks and even dams are con-
trolled by computer systems and a willing adversary can take advantage of that to inflict
massive amounts of damage. Cyber-security tries to protect this information and these
systems. Firewalls and anti-virus offer basic, very needed, but insufficient and inadequate
protection. Intrusion detection and prevention work well for known types of attacks and
intrusions, but still fail in face of sophisticated newer threats. Critical systems employ-
ing fault tolerant frameworks are still successfully exploited by skilled attackers. The big
question here is: how are attackers still bypassing all of these defences? For starters, there
is no such thing as perfect security. Breaches will happen. From defacements to database
leaks, these attacks are the everyday of security professionals. But we will not be focusing
on those.
Attackers are adapting, thieves, terrorists and even mobsters are now operating in the
digital world. Nations are also conducting surveillance and attacks using computers. At-
tackers now have access to highly sophisticated tools and expertise to conduct highly
targeted and very complex attack campaigns. In Figure 1.11 these will be at the top right
corner. It is relatively straightforward to think that this type of adversaries will not be
wasting their time with defacements or database dumps online. They want to be chal-
lenged and will go through great lengths to make sure their presence in the compromised
system is not detected while controlling all of the data. But not all data is important or
valuable. This is referred to as cyber-espionage, where highly skilled attackers with com-
plex tools and a great deal of resources work their way into the target network to exfiltrate
very specific confidential data. This can range from a competitor intellectual property to
a nation’s military defence strategies. It all depends on the adversary’s objective. If their
objective is to shut down another nation’s power grid, that is referred to as cyber-warfare.
1Source: CERT Coordination Center, c© 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University.
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Why send the military to a nuclear facility and start a full out war when you can hide be-
hind the anonymity of the internet and the deniability or the lack of attribution it provides,
and launch a cyber-attack that slowly but surely brings that facility to a shutdown.
Advanced Persistent Threat, or APT, is a term coined by the United States Air Force
around 2006, not only as a way to talk about classified intrusions with uncleared person-
nel, but also to describe the expertise of the attackers and complexity of their tools. It
wrongly and quickly became the standard acronym to describe every sort of attack. APTs
are a particular case of targeted cyber attack performed by organized groups with expertise
and resources to accomplish their goals, that can target both critical infrastructures (such
as telecommunications [149] or SCADA networks [76]) as well as information. Working
together with AnubisNetworks, the focus will be on the e-mail infection vector, which is
widely used by most APT groups.
Industrial Context Acquired by BitSight in late 2014, AnubisNetworks is a brand of
NSEC, Sistemas Informa´ticos, SA. It was founded in 2006 and today is one of Europe’s
leading cyber security companies. Its focus is on anti-spam solutions, threat intelligence
and botnet analysis. In the last twelve months, at the time of writing, AnubisNetworks
processed more than one hundred and twenty million e-mails and discarded almost five
million messages marked as spam or infected. The typical clients consist of telcos, service
providers and large corporations. With companies understanding the risks of infection by
e-mail, specially these advanced tools for espionage, and the big presence AnubisNet-
works has in this market, it was only natural for AnubisNetworks to show interest on the
topic and a partnership was created with Faculdade de Cieˆncias, Universidade de Lisboa,
to research this matter and develop this work.
1.1 Motivation
Citing Mandiant [93], ”Everyone now knows what seasoned security professionals
have long been aware of: there is no such thing as perfect security. Security breaches are
inevitable, because determined threat actors will always find a way through the gap.” And
more often than not we see news about a new attack or a new vulnerability being found.
Cyber-crime is at an all time high with Norton reporting [102] that in 2013, costs re-
lated to cyber security incidents were as high as $113 Billion with the average cost per vic-
tim rising 50% compared to previous years. Cyber-crime is profitable and attackers will
not back down. But who are these attackers? How are they able to be illegally inside a net-
work for an average of 229 days before being found and why did only 33% of the compa-
nies approached by Mandiant discovered the breach by themselves [93]? Google’s breach,
called Operation Aurora, in 2010 [37, 138] and the RSA attack in 2011 [29, 115] got
huge media attention on the issue of cyber-espionage. In the 2008 cyber-attacks against
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Figure 1.1: Attack Sophistication vs. Intruder Technical Knowledge
Georgia, attackers were able to disrupt news agencies, banks and telecommunication in-
frastructures, weeks before the Russian invasion. Together with STUXNET [151, 40],
a weapon entirely made of code targeting Iran’s nuclear centrifuges, Shamoon and oth-
ers [148, 30], these attacks showed the world that malicious code can and will be used as
a weapon. Cyber-insecurity is a serious problem and companies have started to increase
their budget on information security and taking precautions with contracted third parties.
FireEye [45] even reports on the fact that some companies are signing new third party
contracts and are taking into account compensation if an attacker uses that third party to
gain access to the company network. Information Security Media Group together with
PaloAlto Networks [56] report very interesting findings, specifically, nearly 40% of their
respondents have now an APT incident response plan, with more than 50% investing in
tools for early detection. Unfortunately 43% still report a lack of budget to fight targeted
attacks and a lot of companies still fall for the same old tricks, showing us that awareness
sessions are still not a priority for these companies.
Like Sun Tzu said in The Art of War [137], ”If you know the enemy and know yourself,
you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy,
for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor
yourself, you will succumb in every battle”. In this work we will gather the knowledge
about adversaries, their tools, and their procedures. We achieve this by analysing the life
cycle of an APT, profiling attackers and surveying attack reports from various sources.
This will help the community better understand the problem as it stands currently. At the
time of writing there was nothing similar in the literature. We will then try to see how
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the problem will evolve, i.e., how the attackers will work in the future, and propose new
approaches on how to fight them.
In this modern age, mobile devices are the norm, and unfortunately Norton [102]
reports that almost half of mobile device users do not use basic precautions such as pass-
words, security software or back up their files. These devices are everywhere, increasingly
more powerful and ever more connected to each other, giving attackers a shiny new in-
fection vector to exploit. For instance, the two-factor authentication used by many online
services with the help of mobile devices, was recently broken with some clever social
engineering techniques [31].
1.2 Objectives
With this work we intended to first and foremost understand Advanced Persistent
Threats. From grasping the real concept of the name to discerning what are the usual
tactics, techniques and procedures used in these attacks, we set ourselves to conduct a
thorough investigation not only to make this information available to all, but especially
in the hopes of helping AnubisNetworks in their future challenges. By understanding the
problem, more specifically by understanding why the problem still persists, we will dis-
cuss ideas and related work on how one can prevent and/or detect an Advanced Persistent
Threat. By working together with AnubisNetworks, a very active anti-spam company, we
challenged ourselves to provide the blueprints of a system that could be used to detect
and act on certain types of these threats. Mainly because of time constraints , the system
was not developed in the scope of this work. Although the initial work plan was to build
a forensic tool, it was soon verified that without a thorough research it would not be pos-
sible to plan an efficient forensic or prevention tool. Therefore we conducted a survey
on available reports regarding these attacks with the intent of providing an agglomerate
of data that will help future researchers understand the different problems persisting with
APTs. And finally we tried to predict the future of these attacks. New defence frame-
works are being developed, what will adapt when they are in use? How will attackers
react? And how can we prepare for their adaptation?
1.3 Contributions
With this work we hope not only to better inform the information security community
about the APT acronym, what it represents and what makes it different but also to provide
our own, clear definition of Advanced Persistent Threat and hope that it will improve
future discussions and research on the topic. The main contributions of this work are
accomplished in several parts, all of them tackling the APT problem from a different
angle. After analysing the typical APT life cycle in detail and understanding what each
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step represents, we profile the attackers and explain why traditional defences are so easily
bypassed. We then explain what was clear to us amidst this research: fighting APTs can,
and should, be divided in two sub-categories, prevention and detection. Prevention not
only includes what to do before the attack, but also what to do after a breach. For the
detection objective we first take a more specific approach and a framework is proposed
for use at AnubisNetworks in order to detect these type of attacks at the e-mail vector.
Then, we take a more broad look on how to detect and block APTs, by analysing possible
solutions and related work at the different levels, specifically the Internet, Intranet and
Host levels of abstraction. We hope not only to aid future researchers with the study
here presented but also to provide interested readers with relevant data as a result of a
survey conducted on APT attacks. Finally we share our thoughts on the possible directions
attackers will take with their techniques and procedures for the future.
1.4 Document Structure
This work is divided in six chapters. Chapter one introduces the problem, the mo-
tivation, our objectives and our contributions. In Chapter two a review is presented of
related work and the state of the art regarding not only APTs but also different ways of
increasing infrastructure and systems protection against attacks. Chapter three, four and
five hold the main contributions of this work. Chapter three will focus on the study of
the APT problem, from definition of the acronym to the understanding of why traditional
defence mechanisms do not stop it. Chapter four presents the survey conducted on Ad-
vanced Persistent Threat attacks and chapter five is where we express our thoughts on
both prevention and detection of APTs, together with what might be the future of such
threats. Finally, chapter six is kept for discussion and future work as well as conclusions.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
2.1 General studies on Advanced Persistent Threats
Before getting into specifics, one must first fully understand the problem at hand. Be-
cause our work follows and complements this line of study we will now take a look at
previous work done on APT definition, typical attack phases and adversaries as well as
some general notions related to these threats. Levine [84] did an exceptionally thorough
study on the topic and although he provided the usual APT definition, steps and actors,
where his work really stands out is in the study of losses caused by the attacks. Not only
the impact on corporations but, more importantly, collateral or secondary damages. In
particular Google’s loss of market share in China as a result of Operation Aurora and
the suffering of the people of Iran as a consequence of international sanctions regarding
the country’s Nuclear program, which is now delayed because of STUXNET. It is not so
much a technical work but a look at the APT problem from a social and economical point
of view. Similar to this work, Marczak et al. [94] wrote about the use of APT tactics by
oppressive governments on their citizens, with shocking aftermaths such as imprisonment,
kidnaps and even missing citizens. Le Blond et al. [83] studied the problem through the
lens of a non-governmental organization and concluded that the regular phishing emails
targeting said organizations make use of remarkably tenacious and highly developed so-
cial engineering tactics.
Symantec’s report [134] concentrates on the industrial espionage side of APTs, show-
ing us some real attack examples, APT actor profiles and modus operandi. They also
introduce a new term, MOTA, or Massive Organizational Targeted Attacks. The idea be-
hind this term is simple, if the adversary has a zero day vulnerability he might want to
use it to infect several organizations simultaneously for maximum information control.
Without going into detail, the authors explain a system in use by the company to detect
these attacks. If a certain email meets a specific set of criteria, it is analysed in a semi-
manual process that will identify false positives, leaving only the remaining emails to be
manually screened.
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Chen et al. [23] did a high-quality study on APTs as well, from definition to attack
model, and possible countermeasures. The authors do not go into great detail but give
the overall ideas for defences against APTs, such as awareness training, advanced mal-
ware detection and anomaly detection. The research is quite similar to ours and we hope
to add even more information, especially the survey, predictions and possible detection
techniques.
Vries [32] did very interesting work on this topic. From the simulation of typical
attack steps to the proposal of a new APT framework. This framework links high level
attack structures to low level attack methods. It also takes into account attack steps,
features, and detection location, as well as analysis and business aspects. One of the
most challenging research topics, also acknowledged by this author, is the detection of
the starting point of infection. Nowadays people can receive malicious files or be directed
to phishing websites from several different sources, including by phone. We can try to
block the attack in the email but many other infection vectors remain open.
2.2 Detection of Advanced Persistent Threats
Now that we have seen related work about APTs, we present research done on fighting
them. Any good defence against APTs will involve several components working together.
Recently Moon et al. [97] did research on a Multi-Layer Defence System (MLDS) that
can defend against APTs using the same techniques employed by security information
and event management systems, that is, by collecting and analysing log information from
devices, servers and end-users. The framework makes use of eight different modules,
from classifiers and storage to analysers and managers, all working together, communi-
cating with one another to try and detect the attacks. Although theoretically feasible and
in the correct path to protect organizations against APTs, in practice a system like this
would need to merge thousands of logs from different hardware and software, and show
those logs to an administrator that would still need to go through them manually. More
research needs to be done on this topic, i.e., how to efficiently combine different system
logs, detect false positives and semi-automatically, or automatically, block these attacks
on the fly.
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems follow a similar ap-
proach. By collecting logs and other security related events from servers, networks, fire-
walls, anti virus or intrusion prevention systems, which are then forwarded to a manage-
ment unit, the system provides a centralized tool for administrators to inspect and flag
anomalies. These systems can be profiled with what normal event conditions are and
become an unsupervised anomaly detector. Gabriel et al. [49] did work in data mining
to better feed SIEM systems with hidden patterns in malware. By finding associations
between malware attributes and grouping them by similarity into clusters, they show how
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native data mining methods are applicable for the analysis of relevant security log data,
such as policy violations.
Bianchi et al. [12] worked on Blacksheep, a distributed system for detecting a com-
promised host amongst similar machines by comparing memory dumps from different
hosts. The system works relatively well as long as systems are homogeneous and a vi-
able memory dump can be obtained, i.e., at a comparable ”checkpoint” across machines.
The authors also claim that virtualization or cloud-based systems offer ideal settings for
the collection of memory dumps. Therefore a company hosting virtualized workstations
could take precise system snapshots and feed those to the Blacksheep to obtain the best
possible results. Some of the problems that remain include the malware making little to
no use of memory, the timing of the snapshots and the possibility of the malware to es-
cape from the guest to the host machine, as it has happened in the past with other similar
attacks [99].
Giura and Wang [52] not only did research on APTs, but also proposed a new model
called attack pyramid and a new detection framework, which makes use of that model,
to detect APTs. The goal is to differentiate normal, abnormal and known malicious be-
haviours by correlating the different planes in the pyramid. This can be achieved with the
use of a powerful large scale distributed system. Similar to an anomaly detector, if the
analysed behaviour is not normal, not malicious, and if the attack confidence indicator to-
gether with the risk level rise above a specific threshold, an APT alarm will be triggered,
and just like the anomaly detector problem, we first need to understand what behaviours
are considered abnormal and how to map them in the system.
Oprea et al. [105] proposed a graph framework to identify small communities of
early-stage malware infections. Besides providing us with a new Command and Control1
(C&C) detector tailored to an enterprise setting, what differentiates this work from others
is the fact that the system does not require malware binaries for training. Connections
to uncommon destinations, specifically, new or unpopular, are called rare destinations
and are the starting point of the detection scheme. A total of eight features were used
in the scoring algorithm. Although this system would not be able to detect waterhole
attacks from frequently visited websites, compromised third parties that work close with
the company or communications using other protocols, it managed to achieve a 98.33%
of true positives with a false negative rate at 6.35%.
Since highly sophisticated and targeted attacks make use of zero-day exploits, and
zero-day attacks are difficult to prevent because they exploit unknown vulnerabilities,
Bilge and Dumitras [13] did an interesting study and developed a tool for automatic de-
tection of past zero-day attacks. If the system detects the presence of an executable that
was unknown before but now its behaviour is related to a disclosed vulnerability, that
1Designation given to the machine, or set of machines, controlling the attack operations by direct com-
munication with the infected machine(s).
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executable is classified as a zero-day attack. Not only this tool helps with the systematic
study of these threats and provides data for the debate on the full disclosure policies, they
had some interesting findings. For instance, the public disclosure of vulnerabilities was
followed by an increase of up to five orders of magnitude in the volume of attacks ex-
ploiting those vulnerabilities compared to previous numbers. They could also notice that,
on average, a zero-day exploit had three hundred and twelve days of use until the vul-
nerability was disclosed. Unfortunately, because the binary reputation data only reports
on executable files and on machines running their product, they were unable to detect
attacks from the web, exploits using polymorphic malware or non-executable exploits
(PDF, XLSX, DOC, etc), which still are the preferred APT delivery method.
Chandola et al. [22] did a very detailed survey on anomaly detection and although one
of the biggest challenges in this area are the assumptions regarding what are the normal
and anomalous behaviours, the overall idea remains the same. An example is shown in
Figure 2.1, taken from the same work. N1 and N2 represent the normal behaviour, in line
with our work this would be the typical websites visited by our network hosts, typical
emails and even typical host events, while O1, O2 and O3 are anomalies, which could
be, for example, a new FTP connection to an unknown IP address. These systems and
frameworks are of great help, and we will later see how they are not enough.
Anagnostakis et al. [7] presented a novel hybrid architecture of honeypots and anomaly
detectors, called Shadow Honeypots. The idea is simple, traffic that is thought anomalous
is processed by the shadow honeypot, this shadow is a copy of the system in production,
configured to detect possible attacks. The outcome is then used to filter future attacks and
update the anomaly detector. Two anomaly detection heuristics were used in the proof-
of-concept, fingerprints of spreading worms and buffer overflow detection. The system
cannot handle polymorphic attacks and induced a 20-50% overhead.
Friedberg et al. [47] also recently contributed with research regarding anomaly detec-
tors to combat APTs. In their work they not only explained why current security solu-
tions are insufficient, they also discuss the model definition of a novel anomaly detection
approach based on log analysis. Contrary to the existing mechanisms, this approach con-
structs a model while processing the input. By combining multiple rules and analysing
multiple logs, the system is able to detect anomalies that would otherwise go undetected,
e.g. an administrator login with several failed attempts in a short time followed by the
copy of large amounts of data. Obviously a system like this will use a lot of resources and
the administrator will still have to spend valuable time performing root-cause analysis.
What we see in this research area and on these proposed frameworks is a need for
event correlation and anomaly detection. That happens because, and we will come back
to this later on, traditional defence systems lack the ability to detect unknown malware,
they are mostly based on blacklisting, that is, a list of known malicious executables to
block. Adversaries know this and exploit it by creating custom malware for their attack
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Figure 2.1: Example of anomalies in a 2-dimensional data set
campaigns, making it extremely successful. Modern schemes need to work around this
and employ strategies that will detect unknown malware [11], they look to achieve this by
searching for abnormal behaviour in the network, hosts or connections as well as logging
every event and try to filter out security related ones that could possibly be a sign of
infection. Although in the right direction, anomaly detectors still have a great number
of false positives. In this ever changing online world what was abnormal yesterday may
be normal today, as companies change the way they work. Additionally they are also
flawed in their most basic assumptions [125], specifically, the inappropriate use of tools
borrowed from the machine learning community. Anomaly detection makes great use of
machine learning to find abnormal behaviour, something unseen before, but the strength
of machine learning is in finding activity similar to something previously seen, something
known, and because of that, machine learning components are very rarely used in real
world cyber security settings. As for event correlation, looking at the security logs of a
large corporation is similar to looking for a needle in a haystack, systems will still miss
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relevant actions and administrators will still need to manually inspect them.
2.3 Stopping the email before it is too late
If delivery is so successful, some researchers try to tackle the problem at its roots,
specifically the email attack vector. Amin et al. [6] proposed a new email-filtering tech-
nique focused on persistent threat and recipient-oriented features. Taking as input the
email’s specific data, like the role that a specific person has in the organization or how
many hits that person’s email has on Google, the random forest classifier either classifies
emails as targeted malicious email or non-targeted malicious email. Despite its low false
positive rate, the framework does not consider file attachments. The researchers proposed
that addition for future work which would make the framework much more effective in
combating APTs, which still make great use of the email vector and their attachments to
infect their targets. Dewan et al. [35] did similar work but focusing on the differences
between normal spam, or phishing, and spear-phishing email. According to them, the
additional information, or context, used together with social engineering tactics are what
separate a regular phishing attack from a spear-phishing one. This type of extra infor-
mation can be extracted from social media like LinkedIn. Features like job level, email
subject, attachment name and most frequently occurring words in the message are used
to differentiate benign, spam and spear-phishing messages. Success rates were as high as
98.28% in spear versus spam email classification, but overall accuracy dropped versus be-
nign email because of the absence of attachment features in the data set, related to privacy
issues. The addition of social media and, despite being very light, analysis of the attach-
ment are already a very big step towards blocking APT delivery and an improvement to
previous work.
Stringhini and Thonnard [130] propose a new approach to detect spear-phishing emails
sent from compromised accounts, i.e., by admitting the compromise of an inside host
they try to prevent further compromise by blocking malicious emails sent from that host.
Writing, composition, and interaction habits were used as attributes for profiling sender
behaviours. They had a detection rate above 90% for users with more than a thousand
emails sent and false positives could be dealt with the use of two-factor authentication,
a confirmation of some sort informing the user of an email that is about to be sent and
if it was the user who sent it. An attacker could wait and learn the normal behaviour of
the infected target, however, the authors prove how it is difficult for an attacker to figure
out which specific features are the most representative of a user’s writing style, since they
vary from user to user.
Focusing on a more proactive approach Wendt [143] introduced Omen, a simple tool
to help administrators in identifying potential spear-phishing targets before the email is
sent. Using logs of abnormal visits to a company’s website, the idea is to help the ana-
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lyst find suspicious patterns faster than the attacker can craft a spear-phishing message.
First they attempt to distinguish browser from crawler traffic, effectively separating and
decreasing the amount of data that analysts have to look at. Then, with an interactive user
interface, an administrator can see different user’s visit patterns. Off course this is still
very dependent on the skill of the person inspecting the logs and on them being able to
distinguish between normal visits to the website and adversaries gathering information.
Just as we approached the problem in this work, other researchers also saw the criti-
cality of the email infection vector and the problems people bring to the overall security
of a system. It does not matter how good and secure your doors are if someone opens the
windows. It is a challenging topic because of the inherent privacy issues, but also due to
the requirement of categorizing benign and malicious emails. Will the system have access
to the full email, or just meta data? Can the system open attachments or just check the
hashes? Unfortunately, to be effective, the system would need to be intrusive. As we will
show later in this work, email infection vector is a big part of APTs and if systems were
able to detect and neutralize those emails, the adversaries would need to re-adapt.
2.4 Stopping data exfiltration
More oriented towards preventing cyber-espionage, other researchers accept the at-
tacker’s breach and try to detect or block data leaks. Parno et al. [110] propose CLAMP,
an architecture that adds data confidentiality to the LAMP2 model, preventing data leaks
even in the presence of compromise, by enforcing strong access control while making
few changes to application code. The architecture focuses on ensuring that private infor-
mation can only be accessed by the respective owner, focusing on strong authentication
rather than in confidentiality, and on isolating code ran by different users. By assigning an
entire virtual web server to each user, all activity from that web server can be attributed to
that particular user and isolated from others. Using virtualization requires increased hard-
ware capabilities, but with only a 5-10 ms delay, the increased confidential data security
justifies the costs.
Borders and Prakash [16] admit the impossibility of sensitive data leak detection and
focus on measuring and constraining its maximum volume. By understanding that a large
portion of legitimate traffic is repeated or constrained by protocol specifications, and ig-
noring this data, real information leaving the network can be isolated regardless of data
hiding techniques. With a focus on the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and its in-
teraction with Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) and Javascript, by computing the
expected content of HTTP requests, the amount of unconstrained outbound bandwidth is
the difference between actual and expected requests. Despite its limitations the scheme
was able to contain the maximum volume of data leak to approximately 1.5% of the raw
2Linux, Apache, MySQL, Perl/PHP
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request size. The leak would still be possible, but in very small portions. This might help
other systems that would capture this type of behaviour as malicious and report on it.
This is another interesting way of looking at the APT problem. By acknowledging
that the adversary will be successful in his initial infection, and that we will not be able
to detect his presence or steps inside the network, we might be able to stop him at the
exit, that is, by blocking data exfiltration, the most common APT objective. The adver-
saries will always adapt and if the normal exfiltration techniques stop working they might
move to cloud services, peer-2-peer or physical methods. Nevertheless, data exfiltration
blocking and/or detection is still a very interesting research topic with a lot of work still
to do.
2.5 Protecting Critical Infrastructures
Although it is not the focal point of this work, we talk next about some work done
on protecting critical infrastructures, defined by governments as essential assets for the
correct functioning of society and economy. APTs most common objective is espionage,
but different groups, such as governments, may use the same techniques to get a military
advantage over their targets or simply just to cause chaos and destruction. Because of that,
protection of critical infrastructures has seen an increase in research, specifically smart
grids, thanks to their inherent importance in society and latest work developed on creating
a more modern, connected grid. Lu et al. [91] presented a classification and evaluation
of security threats on smart grids. Following the CIA3 model, their categorization targets
three types of attacks in terms of their goals, information confidentiality, data integrity
and network availability. Since the highest priority in the smart grid is availability, the
authors conducted an experiment to understand the feasibility of a denial of service attack
and its consequences. The studied protocol proved to be quite resilient, the authors found
that the performance does not degrade until the attack intensity index approaches one, i.e.
the attacker is flooding more than 90% of the network bandwidth. It would be interesting
to see similar research, but instead of brute-force flooding, injecting specifically crafted
messages to try and exploit weak protocol definitions.
Skopik et al. [124] also did research on the smart grids, particularly how they deal with
APTs. By checking the logs and using a white-list based anomaly detection approach
in the SCADA backends, due to their restrictive and predictable behaviour, the authors
believe that APT attacks can be detected. The system successfully detected an anomaly
in a SCADA operation, since an event occurred without a corresponding firewall entry.
The framework looks promising, although it would be curious to see it preform under
several different circumstances and network layouts.
Finally, Bessani et al. [10] presented CRUTIAL, an intrusion-tolerant and self-healing
3The triad of Information Security: Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability.
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information switch designed to protect critical infrastructures, while preserving legacy
systems. By building a WAN of LANs, it becomes possible to define realms with distinct
trustworthiness levels, focusing the problem on protecting realms from one another. The
switch itself uses a rich access control model, is intrusion-tolerant and can be installed
to resemble a distributed firewall. The authors propose four different deployment types
depending on the criticality of the service and the corresponding performance require-
ments. Some open problems remain, one of them is how to keep the communication
infrastructure resilient at lower costs.
As we can see from previous research, Advanced Persistent Threats are a never end-
ing topic, from understanding the groups behind them and what reasons move them to
develop such offensive capabilities, to learning the true consequences, both socially and
economically, of successful attacks. This has driven researchers to work on blocking such
threats and their most prevalent infection vectors by developing frameworks and systems
capable of dealing with previously unknown malware, tactics and techniques. Later on in
this work, after we have understood the APT problem, we will add to this discussion our
ideas of standalone systems and systems that working together will help on the prevention
and detection of APTs.

Chapter 3
A study on Advanced Persistent Threats
3.1 What is an Advanced Persistent Threat
Advanced Persistent Threat is agreed in the security community to be a term coined
by the United States Air Force (USAF) around 2006, in a small meeting room, as a way to
talk about classified intrusions with uncleared personnel [142, 46]. Explained by a former
USAF Intelligence Officer, Richard Bejtlich1, ”Advanced means the adversary can oper-
ate in the full spectrum of computer intrusion. They can use the most pedestrian publicly
available exploit against a well-known vulnerability, or they can elevate their game to
research new vulnerabilities and develop custom exploits, depending on the target’s pos-
ture. Persistent means the adversary is formally tasked to accomplish a mission. They
are not opportunistic intruders. Like an intelligence unit they receive directives and work
to satisfy their masters. Persistent does not necessarily mean they need to constantly ex-
ecute malicious code on victim computers. Rather, they maintain the level of interaction
needed to execute their objectives. Threat means the adversary is not a piece of mindless
code. This point is crucial. Some people throw around the term ”threat” with reference
to malware. If malware had no human attached to it (someone to control the victim, read
the stolen data, etcetera), then most malware would be of little worry (as long as it didn’t
degrade or deny data). Rather, the adversary here is a threat because it is organized and
funded and motivated. Some people speak of multiple groups consisting of dedicated
crews with various missions.”
Another interesting remark from Bejtlich: ”Too many critics focus on malware, ig-
noring (or being unaware) of the impressive management and administration applied to
repeatedly attempting to access, or preserving access to target organizations. APT inci-
dents are not hit-and-run, smash-and-grab affairs.”
It was only around 2010, when Google revealed that it was a victim of a so called
APT attack and security companies started selling anti-APT systems, that the term got a
1http://taosecurity.blogspot.pt/2010/01/what-is-apt-and-what-does-
it-want.html Accessed 02-February-2015
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commercial connotation. As Kaspersky puts it2, ”There are two ways to look at it: APT
as a thing and APT as people. On the one hand, an advanced persistent threat refers to a
highly precise sort of cyberattack. On the other hand, advanced persistent threat can also
refer to the groups, often state sponsored or well-funded in other ways, that are responsi-
ble for launching such precision attacks.” As for Symantec3,”An APT is a type of targeted
attack. Targeted attacks use a wide variety of techniques[...]. APTs can and often do use
many of these same techniques. An APT is always a targeted attack, but a targeted attack
is not necessarily an APT.” Mandiant4 on the other hand ”defines the APT as a group of
sophisticated, determined and coordinated attackers that have been systematically com-
promising U.S. government and commercial computer networks for years.” And finally,
the definition according to the National Institute of Standards and Technology [101], ”an
adversary that possesses sophisticated levels of expertise and significant resources which
allow it to create opportunities to achieve its objectives by using multiple attack vectors
(e.g., cyber, physical, and deception). These objectives typically include establishing
and extending footholds within the information technology infrastructure of the targeted
organizations for purposes of exfiltrating information, undermining or impeding critical
aspects of a mission, program, or organization; or positioning itself to carry out these ob-
jectives in the future. The advanced persistent threat: (i) pursues its objectives repeatedly
over an extended period of time; (ii) adapts to defenders’ efforts to resist it; and (iii) is
determined to maintain the level of interaction needed to execute its objectives.” For the
interested reader, [23] has a very good, up-to-date research on the topic, [126] explains
the different components and techniques in a successful attack and [1] has a selection of
APT reports which is regularly updated.
3.1.1 How we see an Advanced Persistent Threat
It is easy to see how an APT is a sophisticated type of targeted attack. They can
either be highly social engineered or highly technical. NSA, for example, makes use of
sophisticated tools that have a success rate as high as 80% [129] with little to no use of
social engineering. This includes zero day vulnerabilities, exploiting operating systems or
applications and attacks on hardware, such as hard drive firmware or Basic Input Output
System infection [144, 21]. Unfortunately we now know things do not stop here, we
are now aware of attacks on global communications and the weakening of cryptographic
algorithms for espionage reasons. We will not be tackling these kind of attacks in our
proposed frameworks for lack of time and capacity to approach the problem in the detail
it deserves. Instead we will focus our efforts in the less technical attacks that make bigger
2http://blog.kaspersky.com/apt/ Accessed 02-June-2015
3http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/white_papers/b-
advanced_persistent_threats_WP_21215957.en-us.pdf Accessed 02-June-2015
4https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF_MTrends_2010.pdf Accessed 02-June-
2015
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use of the social engineering vector. Social engineering is still a very effective intrusion
method and Mitnick has a very interesting book on the topic [96]. The attacks might still
make use of sophisticated techniques but are prevalently accompanied by some sort of
social engineering to trick the victim into doing something to help the attacker.
In this work we will try to approach the problem from a different perspective, our
definition of an APT is similar but not equal to its original term. We agree with Bejtlich
when he says that many people focus on the malware part, so we will look at an APT as
a campaign, as a process, a continuous action in time. What makes it advanced, is not
only the spectrum of computer intrusion or the sophistication of the malware, but what
goes behind the scenes, i.e., the infrastructure, management, teams, budget, and eventual
government involvement, before, during and after the objective is completed. As for the
persistence, we agree with the original definition. The objective is divided into smaller
problems, each assigned to their specific team. No team will stop until they succeed
with their mission. What makes it a threat is the human factor. The tools used by these
groups are not your typical worm or virus, they rely on their masters input and this human
interaction is what makes these attacks a real threat.
A recent cyberattack platform called Regin [72] is a great example of such a threat.
Discovered in 2012 with samples dating as far back as 2003, it is still unclear how initial
compromise was conducted. Undetected for almost ten years and affecting only 27 differ-
ent victims such as telecom operators, government institutions and advanced mathemati-
cal/cryptographic researchers, the adversaries objectives were intelligence gathering and
facilitation of other types of, highly targeted, attacks. The implementation, coding meth-
ods, hiding techniques and flexibility make Regin one of the most sophisticated attack
platforms of recent times. The amount of resources, organization and expertise depicted
in such an attack made researchers point at a possible nation-state sponsor. A few years
later, the tool was linked to the National Security Agency [117].
3.2 What makes it different?
How are these attacks different from what we see and hear on the news every now and
then? Old virus are not a problem any more, you used to know you were infected because
you could actually see what the virus did, such as all of the console letters falling down
the screen or an ambulance passing across the desktop, as shown in Figure 3.1, these were
viruses made by hobbyist motivated by curiosity and intellectual challenges. Unfortu-
nately things changed for the worse, attackers started to go after fame and recognition,
these are the attackers that will show you a big you have been hacked message, deface
your website and leak your database. Together with this development, a new form of or-
ganized crime emerged, focused on the digital world. Motivated to make easy and quick
money, cyber-criminals infected millions of machines and continued, to this day, working
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Figure 3.1: Examples of infections
on new forms of making cash. From ransom-ware [26], like the one seen in Figure 3.2, to
creating and selling malware toolkits [27], building your own botnet [3], and off course
the typical credit card frauds [80] and personal information harvesting.
Things are not quite the same for an APT hacker. He has evolved. For starters he does
not want to be known or found, he does not want media attention or fame, he wants to
remain in the shadows for as long as possible. He is not looking for quick monetary gains,
he is looking for information, he is looking to control the targeted infrastructure, making
sure he always has another way in. He will study your organization, your employees and
your assets, he will make such use of social engineering tactics that the email you receive
will look just like any benign day-to-day email. Even compared against the typical botnet
masters, the malware used here is relatively different. A zombie would not be looking for
SSH credentials, valid root certificates or specific supervisory control and data acquisition
systems. An example of such differences can be observed in Table 3.1. A message by
the ”Honker Union of China”, a very famous hacker group in the country, in 2010 to its
members says: ”What benefit can hacking a Web page bring our country and the people?
It is only a form of emotional catharsis, please do not launch any pointless attacks, the real
attack is to fatally damage their network or gain access to their sensitive information” [73],
Chapter 3. A study on Advanced Persistent Threats 21
Figure 3.2: Example of ransom-ware
it is clear the shift in tactics, procedures and objectives even in the hacking community.
Typical Botnet Malware objectives APT specific objectives
Capture e-mails Read local data
Capture passwords Record audio
Capture credit card numbers Record video
Use machine for spamming Safe and stealthy exfiltration
Use machine for DDoS Self-termination
Table 3.1: Example of different malware characteristics
3.3 Analysing Advanced Persistent Threat Life cycles
There are several proposed attack life cycles that enumerate each and every step of
a campaign. Mandiant, in Figure 3.3, Palo Alto Networks, in Figure 3.4, as well as
Wrightson [147] in Figure 3.5 and ZScaler in Figure 3.6 proposed new and different
cycles specifically for APT campaign categorization.
Although data exfiltration continues to be the most common APT objective, and is
used in all the life cycles, both Palo Alto and Mandiant include a different phase, called
destruction or complete mission, to better help us understand that the attacker might be
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Figure 3.3: APT Lifecycle proposed by Mandiant
more interested in shutting down or disrupting a system, like data wiping, disabling criti-
cal infrastructures or flooding of communication channels.
These life cycles are quite generic and use different names for steps representing the
same actions, for example, exploitation and initial compromise or progression and lateral
compromise. The idea stays the same, the adversary will study your organization, will
target specific people and/or services, exploit them and complete its objective. With that
in mind, we will tackle the cycle proposed by DELL SecureWorks, depicted in Figure 3.7,
since it is built with several more phases, giving us the chance to understand them better
as a whole and individually. Using the chosen life cycle as baseline, a longer description
for each phase and some critiques are given next.
Define objectives and targets
First, the attackers will have to define, or receive from their superiors, an objec-
tive. This could be a short term objective or long term goal. What exactly do
they need? Usually they want access to information (software code, government
strategies, academic research and others), but they might also want to shut down a
country’s electrical grid or communication channels. With clear objectives defined,
now they need to choose their targets. By targets we mean people, organizations or
governments holding the necessary information for the adversary to be successful.
This can be a low hanging fruit, like an unprotected third party working for a highly
secured company, or a nation electricity provider.
Find and organize accomplices
The sophistication and work necessary to successfully carry out an attack like this
make it impossible for one person only. Although this type of attackers usually
already have organized teams of skilled developers, experienced testers, and are
sometimes backed up by states [44, 92], different hacking groups can merge to
tackle more sophisticated targets. And if a team can not be created, there is always
the possibility of a water hole [146] attack, where the attackers would only need to
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Figure 3.4: PaloAlto Networks APT Lifecycle
choose which website to target, infect it and wait for the target to visit it. If physical
penetration is required, insider attacks [48] are a viable option, such as paying a
soon to be ex-employee to release the malware in the target network. Throughout
our work we will be referring to insider threats or attacks following the definition
in Silowash et al. work [122]:
”...is a current or former employee, contractor, or business partner who meets the
following criteria:
Figure 3.5: APT Lifecycle proposed by Wrightson
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Figure 3.6: APT Lifecycle proposed by ZScaler
• has or had authorized access to an organization’s network, system, or data;
• has intentionally exceeded or intentionally used that access in a manner that
negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organi-
zation’s information or information systems.”
Build or acquire tools
Unless the tools the attackers are building/acquiring are going to be used in the re-
connaissance phase, weaponizing without knowing the target capabilities would be
a waste of resources, so this should be done after the research phase. Custom tools
have a lower chance to be detected, and are still the preferred choice of attackers.
Add to that a zero-day vulnerability and the attack will most likely be very suc-
cessful [40, 81, 66]. It is worrying that some systems still fall to the use of openly
available remote access trojans [43, 92] exploiting known vulnerabilities [114, 136].
Research target infrastructure/employees
This is the well known reconnaissance/information gathering phase, which can take
months. This can be passive, like open-source intelligence (search engines, social
media, etcetera), which involves no direct interaction between the attacker and the
target, or active, like phone-calls, which will involve direct contact and leaving
traces. It will be done before and after intrusion. Things like infrastructure, ser-
vices and their software versions, employed security, vulnerable systems or peo-
ple, and emails, are what the attackers will be looking for. Tyler Wrightson in his
book [147] has several chapters dedicated to the techniques used by hackers during
reconnaissance, so interested readers are encouraged to check the book. In a nut-
shell, Wrightson organizes reconnaissance like the following (with examples from
the book):
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Figure 3.7: DELL SecureWorks APT Lifecycle
1. Technical reconnaissance
(a) Anti-virus software;
(b) Internet-routable subnets.
2. Non-technical reconnaissance
(a) Geographical locations;
(b) Important personnel.
Test for detection
Although this type of testing can be done online, attackers do not want to raise any
alarms and make their target suspicious. Attackers are known to mimic their victims
environments and test their tools offline. Several APT C&C servers were found with
virtual machines set up like a mirror of their respective victims. STUXNET [40] is
believed to have mimicked their target with meticulous detail, things like software
and their versions, hardware and PLC’s were acquired and installed for live testing.
Deployment/Delivery and Initial intrusion
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Figure 3.8: Example of a spear phishing email
The problem here is how to deliver the tools. Usually, giving use to the extensive
recon phase, attackers like to use spear-phishing, or targeted malicious emails [133,
109, 71] to deliver malicious payload. These are not your typical spam mail, they
are highly personalized, make use of topics of interest and may include the victims
name while pretending to come from a friend. An example of such an email is given
in Figure 3.8. A targeted email was sent after AnubisNetworks publicized their
presence at the BlackHat5 conference, and together with the email was a malicious
payload ready to be delivered. This payload will most likely exploit a vulnerability,
maybe a zero-day, and in nature needs to be of limited size to be able to inject the
necessary code. These are usually generic and will download, after exploitation,
the custom built tools from the C&C and are therefore called droppers. The emails
are personally tailored to entice users into opening attachments or visiting websites.
These emails are so personal that even security conscious users sometimes fall for
them6. Even if this approach does not work, candy drops (USB drives, DVD’s and
even mail packages sent to the target address) or physical access (impersonating
cleaning crew or bribing employees) are other possible options. Not surprisingly,
and especially thanks to water hole attacks, [45] reports that in 2013 the average
number of Web-derived attacks was over three times higher than email-derived at-
tacks. You may be reluctant to follow a link to an unknown website, but what if
it is a trusted one? Initial intrusion happens if the delivery is successful. At this
point the malware is executed and installed, the attacker has control of the infected
machine.
Outbound connection initiated
This is the typical connection check. Most malware will check first for a legitimate
online connection (e.g. GET google.com), and only after will initiate C&C conver-
5https://www.blackhat.com/ Accessed 02-June-2015
6In Mandiant APT1 report [92]: In one case a person replied, “I’m not sure if this is legit, so I didn’t
open it.” Within 20 minutes, someone in APT1 responded with a terse email back: “It’s legit.” The person
then opened the attachment.
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sation. What they do here differs from malware to malware, some will only try to
get updates, others will sleep and wait until a specific time or until they have orders,
and some will exfiltrate machines/network information. This is the main communi-
cation channel between attacker and target organization, therefore, the most vulner-
able phase to detection. The attacker has to be very careful about what monitoring
systems are in place, and use protocols, transmission times and message sizes that
avoid detection.
Obtain credentials, expand access and strengthen foothold
According to [2], 90% of binaries morph within one hour. With access to the net-
work, attackers will want to obtain new tools, gather credentials and expand their
access to other machines using techniques like pass-the-hash [61]. Why? Well,
maybe the machine they got infected is not the one they wanted, at least not yet.
They will also want to have other doors to get inside the network in case one closes.
And they need to do all this while covering their tracks and avoid detection.
Exfiltrate data/Complete objective
Finally, attackers complete their goals, may it be data exfiltration, money theft or
the destruction of infrastructures. This is not usually done in a one-time-hit, but
overtime, with low impact to avoid suspicion and, most importantly, detection.
Cover tracks and remain undetected
In reality this is not a one time phase, this is an every-phase phase, i.e., attackers will
want to remain undetected for the whole campaign, making sure to delete old files
and logs. On one hand, some code will try to make their traffic look as legitimate
as possible, if no flags are raised there is no need to hide anything, and if there is
nothing being hidden then it must be legitimate. On the other hand, some malware
will automatically delete itself after initial infection, wipe the whole machine [132]
and slow down or stop itself if forensic tools are detected.
3.4 A new APT model representation
The previous life cycles have the problem of not grasping the complexity inherent
to an advanced persistent threat attack campaign. Therefore, in order to improve this,
we propose a new way of representing the teams, objectives and usual procedures of an
APT group. This new model, based on all the available literature and knowledge of APT
groups and techniques merged in two simple pictures is shown in figures 3.9 and 3.10.
With this representation we hope to help the security community in understanding better
the complexity in orchestrating, managing and executing a campaign like this. One of the
biggest differences is that previous life cycles focused too much on the cycle and how a
step leads to another. In this model the focus is on how different teams work on different
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phases that evolve in parallel towards a common goal. By showing what kind of teams
are working in these groups and what type of tasks they are assigned, we hope to better
fundament our view of how APTs are more than a piece of sophisticated malware.
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Figure 3.9: APT Model Representation
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Figure 3.10: APT Model Representation (part 2)
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3.5 Profiling attackers
Understanding who is doing these attacks and how they are doing it is crucial. Al-
though the lack of written work is not surprising, it is certain that both parts of the world
are in a constant cyber-battle. Unfortunately most of the literature is about Eastern groups
attacking Western countries. A good example of such a group is Hidden Lynx [36]. Based
in China, with fifty to one hundred operatives and active since at least 2009, they have used
three zero day attacks since 2011 and are known for their organization, agility, resource-
fulness and pioneering ”watering hole” attacks to ambush their targets. The attacks are so
advanced and targeted that they would certainly need research and intelligence gathering
prior to any infection.
Filippoupolitis et al. [42] provide us with a good list of features to profile a cyber-
attacker and we will make use of this list to profile a typical APT adversary following the
information gathered related to the groups and their operatives:
Skill Highly skilled attackers, typically had access to computers from an early age and
developed an interest in hacking or similar activities. Some are expert developers
while others are cryptography geniuses.
Education Usually with higher education and proficient English, these attackers have the
technical and theoretical skills needed to make part of a larger attack team. Most
recently, the groups have started recruiting at the Universities.
Risk As they are usually nation sponsored they are able to operate free from govern-
ment laws. These activities have a very low risk for attackers and states since they
also offer plausible deniability. If they are not state sponsored, they know how to
minimize their risks and mitigate possible repercussions.
Goal The goal, usually, is to exfiltrate data. Some are more cyber-warfare oriented and
might want to disrupt or destroy targeted systems, with very few examples of actual
money theft.
Speed As we have seen before, 90% of binaries morph within one hour of infection.
These attackers are ready and they are fast. As soon as the infection is successful,
they take control.
Mistakes They do make mistakes, typos/bugs in the code and they might leave traces.
After all, they are human. Mandiant reported that one APT1 hacker was lost for
a long while trying to figure out a console command7. It is usually these mistakes
that lead security companies to their attributions.
7http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6p7FqSav6Ho Accessed 15-October-2014
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Anti-forensics Some of the malware reported employs anti-forensics techniques. Al-
though some make use of the usual dummy functions, variables and loops in the
code, others try to detect virtualization and even use run-time decoding in memory.
Success These attacks are very successful and we, the general public, just know about
the reported ones, caught months or even years after initial intrusion. It is not so
hard to believe that there are a lot of undiscovered attacks, or undisclosed ones, and
new ones happening every day.
3.6 Why traditional defences do not work?
As Osorio et al. show in their work [106], ”the old idea of measuring the number of
infected files detected within end-point device as a good measure of their effectiveness
has become obsolete. Instead, measures such as time to detect, time to countermeasure
issuance, and ability to identify short-lived C&C sites seem more relevant to determining
the ’goodness’ of security products”. As we will see next, current security systems make
heavy use of lists with known malware or attacks and only work on detecting those, and
that is why they fail to stop more advanced, custom and modern threats.
Firewalls. Most of this type of attacks make use of the HTTP/HTTPS protocols, on ports
80 and 443, respectively, which are usually open in the firewall. Even if there is
any sort of inspection, encryption will render it useless. At the application level,
WAF’s or Web Application Firewalls, have been proven to fail even against known
attacks [60].
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). There are three different approaches: a) signature-
based or misuse or rule based detection, that compare data against a set of attack
signatures. Because of this a lot of work is spent on updating these systems, and
although known attacks can be detected reliably with a low false positive rate, it will
not detect custom/new attacks with some research showing that they can even be
bypassed [24]; b) anomaly detection, that, like the name says, looks for non-normal
behaviours and therefore does not need to be kept up-to-date on malware signatures.
This type of systems are better at detecting novel attacks and may be a contribution
in the fight against APTs, although, as we have seen before, a lot of work is still
needed in this field. One of the challenges regarding APTs is that the adversary will
study its target and will learn what is normal behaviour in the target. If the attacker
knows the company uses cloud service x to upload documentation, he might pass
undetected and accomplish extraction making use of the same service. Another
major setback in this technology is that they still suffer from large numbers of false
positives, large computational need and the lack of datasets for testing [50]; and
c) hybrid, which combines the best of both worlds. Although intrusion detection
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systems are not in the scope of our study, interested readers are advised to read [86]
which has a good IDS review, covering signature based, anomaly based and stateful
analysis, as well as [119] which has a good survey on the techniques used on
these systems, and [125] which shows how flawed in their most basic assumptions
anomaly detectors are.
Anti-virus. Also signature based and therefore need to be kept up-to-date to be effective.
In 2014 there was on average one hundred and sixty thousand new malware samples
per day [53], with anti virus engines needing to update their rules several times a
day. A late update might dictate a successful infection, as such, anti virus offer
needed protection against known malware and some vendors make use of heuristics
and emulation to detect unknown malware. Nevertheless, custom code and the use
of any sort of morphism might render this defence mechanism useless.
People. Insider attacks, unintentional or not, are still a big problem. People are always
the weakest link, it doesn’t matter how good and secure your system is if your
Chief Security Specialist will gladly give you SSH access and kindly reset your
password [18]. Companies are still not investing enough in security awareness
and training for their personnel which makes them vulnerable to social engineering
attacks.
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Chapter 4
A survey on Advanced Persistent
Threat attacks
Figure 4.1: The number of APT reports per year
When researching on the topic of APTs a lack of meaningful statistics turned out to
be a problem. If there was ever a need to represent how much of these type of attacks
made use of phishing or how many used exploits abusing zero-day vulnerabilities, it was
not possible, the data was just not there, at least in an aggregated way. The purpose of
this survey is not only to fix that, but also to answer other emerging questions, such as,
what the most common infection vector is, which are the most targeted applications and
who are the most active actors.
A survey on the available reports from 2010 to 2014, inclusive, was conducted. Sev-
enty three reports were analysed and they were all gathered from open-source intelligence.
The reports were first selected on the basis of what the companies classified as an APT
attack and were then re-evaluated to our new definition of APT, that is, reports that did
not approach the adversary infrastructure, or that did not look at the ”behind the scenes”,
were discarded.
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By looking at the number of reports per year, there is a clear increase in APT attack
awareness. As it is shown in Figure 4.1 the number of available reports has increased
significantly over the past years, with more than double the reports in 2014 compared
to 2012. Although it is no surprise that the attacks using these techniques are becoming
more prevalent, since they are extremely successful, the increase is also a consequence
of the rise in better prepared professionals and the understanding of the importance in-
formation sharing has on this field. Security companies are now more open to share their
clients breaches as well as enterprises are losing the fear in announcing theirs. This is
an important step to the security community because the more we understand who, why
and how are they performing these attacks the better we can search for ways to prevent
ourselves from becoming just another victim.
Figure 4.2: The most used infection vectors in the data set
Spear-phishing techniques are still the preferred choice of attackers, with two out of
three attacks using this vector as seen in Figure 4.2. Highly social engineered traps,
from e-mail to instant messaging, are used by the adversary to manipulate the victim into
performing certain actions, like visiting a website controlled by the attacker or opening
a malicious file, all via purely digital methods. Instead of targeting the systems, secured
by all types of software and hardware making them hard to breach, the attackers target
people. A well crafted e-mail, exploiting the human factor, is likely to succeed with very
little effort, while on the other hand, a very technical attack will take more effort and cost
more to the adversary. Related to this choice are the most targeted applications, a targeted
user might be suspicious of an executable file, but will have no problem in opening a
Microsoft Office Word or a PDF file, which they most likely already do on a daily basis.
Figure 4.3 shows us how exactly this distribution was observed, with the Office suite
taking the larger piece of the cake and Adobe products, like Reader and Flash, in close
second. Some attacks targeted several applications at once while others were company
specific and targeted in-house built applications, which again shows us how targeted these
attacks can be.
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Figure 4.3: The most targeted applications in the data set
Zero-day vulnerabilities are expensive to buy and extremely difficult to find, so it is
with no surprise that most of these advanced attacks do not really make use of advanced
malware. In this data set, as depicted in Figure 4.4, one in three attacks exploited a
previously unknown vulnerability with their tools. If a known trojan exploring a patched
vulnerability works, there is no need to waste resources on complex malware exploiting
zero-days, the attackers focus on being efficient and target the weakest link. Still zero-day
vulnerabilities have their advantages, for instance, they not only give the attacker a much
higher success rate, they also increase the time the attacker remains in the system, adding
on average one more year until detection.
Attackers behind APTs are more interested in information, or cyber-espionage. As
seen in Figure 4.5, this was clear in the data set. Ninety-two percent of the attacks reported
as final objective information gathering, the attackers know the value of information and
the power it brings, no matter how small or insignificant. From recording microphone
audio to accessing Bluetooth enabled devices and downloading contact information, from
getting fighter jet blueprints [74] to stealing insider information for an advantage in stock
market trading [33]. Cyber-weapons were used very rarely, and probably just as a last
resort. These are complex pieces of software that would require a sizeable budget and, if
traceable back to their origins, could lead to diplomatic incidents. Finally, some instances
of theft were noted, specifically some reports show that malware was being created to
steal certificates [55] that were later sold to other malware creators. By signing their code
with a valid certificate, attackers add another layer of trust to their files, preventing them
from detection and they also might be able to get access to new infection vectors, like a
legitimate software update.
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Figure 4.4: Percentage of zero day vulnerabilities used in the data set
Attribution in the digital world is always difficult, from proxy to proxy, C&C to C&C,
it is always hard to pinpoint the actual origin of the attack. But it is not impossible. The
reports consulted were very thorough and besides looking at the infrastructure, domains
and IP addresses to pinpoint groups or nationalities, they also took into consideration
other factors, such as operating system language and working hours. It is also safe to
assume that these are not your typical cyber-criminals, these are well funded groups with
very specific orders of espionage that would benefit governments the most. Let us take
those assumptions and create a time line of threat actors, depicted in Figure 4.6. Keep
in mind that this time line shows us the predicted year of the earliest malware samples
from the reports dated 2010-2014. It is clear, and known, that cyber-espionage has been
in use since at least the nineties [15]. Especially the United States of America, this is
their playground, they have been studying how to break into systems even before the
system is installed. From the very strict export restrictions of cryptographic material until
1992 [113] to the recent leaks from the ex-NSA contractor Edward Snowden [67], we
have more then enough evidence showing what security professionals knew for a long
time, the United States strive for global cyber dominance and they are not alone. What
is happening is the sort of arms race in the digital world. We can see that in the last
ten years at least eight nations have actively been performing cyber-espionage campaigns
on other nations, or specific individuals. As an interesting fact most of them are also
part of the nuclear-power list, and although no report talked about them, it would be no
surprise that the United Kingdom [85], France and Israel (known to have cooperated with
USA in the makings of STUXNET and Flame [98, 150]), are also making use of code
to accomplish their surveillance and espionage programs. China is one of the biggest
actors, and the loudest one, since every few weeks a new report of a Chinese malware
intended for espionage is released, this got five Chinese military hackers charged with
cyber espionage against the United States [103]. Some authors believe that Russia was
losing ground in this race [51], but as we can see in the time line Russia was quick to
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join the race and had already developed highly sophisticated espionage oriented software
by 2004. A big problem nowadays is that nations don’t even need to produce this type
of software themselves, they can ”legitimately” acquire it from specific vendors12. Not
only that, an increasing number of commercial services offer zero-day vulnerabilities for
their clients3456. This not only opens the field to a lot more, not so technically advanced,
actors, but ultimately can have serious consequences to the people [64]. And every nation
wants to try and level the information play field not only on possible aggressors, but also
on their allies [95].
Figure 4.5: The attackers biggest objectives
Conclusions from this survey include how APTs do not necessarily translate to so-
phisticated code exploiting unknown vulnerabilities. Attackers focus their efforts on the
low hanging fruit and if exploiting a patched vulnerability works, there is no need to ex-
pend more efforts on other alternatives, this means companies will have to follow better
practises regarding software updates and therefore block known infection vectors. We
also found that adversaries are targeting people and their inherent vulnerabilities instead
of systems, which makes investing in security training and awareness key to protect com-
panies. By updating the software in use and preparing the people using it, we are reducing
the adversary attack surface and making them expend more efforts in order to succeed in
their mission. E-mail continues to be a very active attack vector and therefore systems
that are able to inspect messages and quarantine possible infections before they get on the
target inbox will be essential. Not only that, enterprises will need to change the way they
think security and apply mature philosophy, people, processes and technology in their
1http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.html Accessed 15-October-2014
2http://www.hackingteam.it/ Accessed 15-October-2014
3http://www.vupen.com/english/services/lea-index.php Accessed 15-October-
2014
4http://www.revuln.com/ Accessed 15-October-2014
5https://www.endgame.com/ Accessed 15-October-2014
6https://www.exodusintel.com/ Accessed 15-October-2014
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defence plan [104]. Finally, it was noticeable the increase of threat actors throughout the
years, and they are not limited to governments or countries with the capability of perform-
ing such attacks. The spectrum of adversaries is increasing and systems need to take that
into account in their early development stages, as well as people who need to be informed
about the dangers in order to be better prepared.
Figure 4.6: Time line of APT actors
Chapter 5
What to do against Advanced Persistent
Threats
5.1 Preventing an Advanced Persistent Threat
A lot of literature has been tackling the problem of fighting these threats [131, 135,
141, 52, 47, 89], and it is clear that there are at least two ways to look at defence, pre-
vention and detection. We will first look at the importance of prevention and how being
prepared and ready can change the outcome of an attack.
One should plan on being hacked. What will you do when you are a target? No one is
unhackable, being good at security is being able to deal with a hack [17]. What policies,
procedures and guidelines are available to follow before, during and after an attack? Un-
derstand what data and assets are most vital to your operations. What happens if they are
successfully attacked? How are they protected? Be hard to breach! [41] propose a model
making use of game theory to compute the optimal attack path for the adversary, which
then leaves the defender with the best possible response strategies, such as patching the
system or setting up new access control mechanisms. [65] follows a similar approach
with the use of a Markov belief model, by monitoring the current malicious activities and
predicting future actions, that allows monitoring of adversary activity as they progress
through the kill chain. The AVI composite fault model (Attack, Vulnerability and Intru-
sion) goes a step further, proposed in [139] it shows the importance of prevention and
how vital it is to reduce the adversaries attack spectrum. By reducing our systems Vulner-
abilities (prevention) and blocking attacks (detection) we are significantly reducing the
adversary chances of success.
Finally, think like an attacker. Ask yourself the 5ws [145]:
• Who would attack us?
It is really important to distinguish the different types of threats. The defences we
employ if we are facing hacktivists will be different from the ones we set-up against
cyber-criminals or nation states. All of them will use different tactics, procedures
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and have different motives, expertise and money to spend for the success of the
attack.
• What do they want?
We should look at the services we provide, the information we hold and understand
how our assets could be important to the different adversaries described in the pre-
vious point. Client private information, government secrets or desired intellectual
property, are some examples of information that might need increased protection.
• When would they attack us?
Is the company publicising their appearance in a future conference? Did the com-
pany just made a very important announcement? Are we looking to hire new per-
sonnel? All these events can trigger the start of an attack campaign, as well as be
used for spear-phishing mails. If an attacker knows that a company is hiring a devel-
oper, he might send an infected curriculum vitae to the human resources department
and achieve delivery followed by initial infection.
• Where would they strike?
Would they go as far as to physically infiltrate the company? Maybe strike a differ-
ent branch? How good are the security policies in the third parties working for the
company? Are they going for the servers or the people? Should the company be
cautious with e-mails or vulnerable application running at the servers?
• Why would they?
Are they looking to make a quick buck? Is the profit from the attack worth the time
and money spent on it? Will the the company be the latest target of a hacktivist
group? Are they looking to spy on us for the long term? Are they using our network
to target another?
What about systems that prevent these attacks? Anti-virus, firewalls and even extra
preventive software like anti-exploit1 are a needed layer of defence, but as we have seen
before they are not enough. Next we will see how proposed systems and frameworks
could help.
The teams behind an APT campaign usually have one objective, data exfiltration, but
cyber-destruction might also be a goal. To protect critical systems and infrastructures
against destruction we need resilient intrusion tolerance systems and architectures, i.e.,
providing assurance of system operation in the presence of compromise [34, 139, 128].
These are the type of measures governments need to take to increase their countries overall
cyber-security. The focus here is to protect the system from faults, malicious or not, and
1http://www.malwarebytes.org/antiexploit/
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guarantee that the system will continue to work properly. Even with these systems the
problem persists, because the most common objective for the APT team is espionage.
There is a need for completely different defence mechanisms which should focus on
protecting people and data instead of the system as a whole. Data protection and loss
prevention can be achieved with techniques like fragmentation and scattering [39], infor-
mation dispersal [112] and secret sharing [79]. Keep in mind that all these frameworks
are designed so that the attacker cannot acquire the data by targeting what is keeping it,
but if an authorized person legitimately downloads that information and the APT hacker
has already compromised this person’s system, the problem will still persist, the attacker
will have access to the information. Although those frameworks would definitely help
by protecting the servers that are storing the information, awareness training [121] is ex-
tremely important in the fight against APTs. Some researchers have worked on this topic,
i.e., by developing spear-phishing prevention frameworks, it would be possible to protect
the system by preventing people from clicking on or even downloading anything mali-
cious [78, 143, 130, 75, 35]. Spear-phishing is a huge infection vector, and since attack-
ers still make use of infected PDF files, [100] has an up-to-date survey on state-of-the-art
malicious PDF detection.
Despite their huge rate of false positives and the never ending amount of logs, anomaly
based intrusion detection systems could be of help in preventing novel attacks [111], with
some researchers using them to try and predict a compromise [77] but as we have seen
before, they have problems in their basic assumptions. Another problem that remains
even with all this technology is insider attacks, specifically intentional ones (uninten-
tional insider threats happen when people unknowingly fall for a phishing attack). Some
frameworks have been proposed to detect insider attacks [70, 120, 87, 108], but employ-
ers should be alert, conduct proper interviews, both in hiring and on contract termination,
as well as background checks. Administrators should also make sure that the principle of
least privilege2 is enforced by security policies and they should have continued training,
especially in log analysis. It is important, against APT attacks, that administrators are ex-
perienced in analysing logs and do it regularly since one unknown infection in the network
can propagate and cause more damage, [88] proposed a search engine to discover other
victims inside a network during an APT investigation based on attributes acquired from a
known APT victim. Finally, and the best overall defence strategy, pioneered by Lockheed
Martin in 2011, the Intelligence driven defence [62], a defence framework informed by
adversary campaigns and intrusion kill-chains. As stated by the Intelligence and National
Security Alliance [9]: ”A kill chain is a sequence of activities and overall operations that
a threat vector must traverse in order to cause an effect. If the sequence can be interrupted
or defeated at any point, the threat actor cannot inflict the effect that he intends”, i.e., not
only we should think like an attacker and try to predict what they will do next, we should
2Having only the necessary permissions to do a job correctly.
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have several security layers, incrementally more strict, capable of disrupting the overall
attack campaign. [20] extends this concept by allowing the adversary to remain inside the
network in order to learn and gather counter-intelligence for future attacks. By learning
how the different groups conduct their reconnaissance phase, we may be able to predict
better which systems or people are most vulnerable, and therefore, prepare them better. If
the adversary uses spear-phishing, we can use anti-spear-phishing systems or simply have
awareness training sessions to better prepare everyone. If we know that the attackers will
try to use HTTPS to upload files to a C&C we can be vigilant about network traffic and
try to catch it there [140, 14]. It all boils down to understanding the threat and having an
active and prepared security team.
5.2 Detecting an Advanced Persistent Threat
As we have seen, APTs are a mix of complex processes and sophisticated techniques.
Nevertheless, Anti-APT systems are being developed and sold by well known security
companies, including but not limited to FireEye3, DELL4, PaloAltoNetworks5 and ZS-
caler6. Most, if not all of them, make use of sand-boxing techniques in some sort of
appliance or by using cloud services, together with information gathered from threat in-
telligence resources, which is the correct way to go regarding APTs. Nevertheless, when
an independent test was conducted on the most recent, sophisticated and expensive sys-
tems that promise to detect APTs, it was proven that they fail to block even an attack
made with moderate effort [59]. The systems are proprietary so we can not say what they
are doing wrong, or right, and how they are being bypassed.
In order to propose a system built for detection, we must first define the scope of the
detector. Following the data surveyed in Chapter 4, we can see that phishing, more specif-
ically spear-phishing, is the most common vector of attack. The typical APT delivery is
accomplished by an e-mail with either a link or an attachment containing a malicious
exploit that will install a Remote Access Trojan. We will focus on detecting this type
of attacks here, but leave some guidelines for other types of detection in a later section.
For a thorough survey on the techniques and tools used in malware analysis refer to [38],
specifically section five. If the spear-phishing e-mail is not blocked by any other security
measure, one of the most common proposed techniques is the Sandbox. The Sandbox is a
really critical layer of security because it is not signature based. Unfortunately this indus-
try is just like the Anti-Virus one, a cat and mouse game, with attackers trying to detect
if their malware is running on a simulated environment and making use of techniques to
3https://www.fireeye.com/
4http://www.secureworks.com/
5https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/
6https://www.zscaler.com/
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escape it [123], and defenders trying to hide that fact while simulating user input7 and
system calls. By developing custom sandboxes we are increasing the work required by
the adversary. By selling the same sandbox as an appliance we lose that advantage, unless
we carefully control the appliance usage as attackers might just acquire those systems and
study how to bypass them. Both options are viable, some companies will prefer to have
the appliance on their side, while others will be happy to let the computation be done
in the cloud. This brings us to another problem in using this solution, scalability. The
amount of e-mails with attachments and URLs is significant, even for smaller companies,
so which of the e-mails should the system check? A map of the companies personnel
showing who has access to what, and which assets are of vital importance, could help
us identify priority targets for the adversary. Nevertheless, it is important and would be
better to check all e-mails since an attacker might target a ”low priority” employee and
wait for some administrator login on that machine later on.
5.2.1 How a system would work at AnubisNetworks
AnubisNetworks8, a BitSight Company9, is in a prime position to implement a security
system capable of protecting its clients at the e-mail level. Being an anti-spam company,
the attachments and links present in an e-mail can be checked, without violating the pri-
vacy of the users. By building a custom sandbox that would not leave the AnubisNetworks
facilities and execute on it suspected attachments as well as visiting URLs, it would be
possible to provide an even better and safer e-mail protection system. A sample frame-
work is proposed making use of current systems at AnubisNetworks, such as Maltracker
and Mail Protection System (MPS), which is a security e-mail gateway with carrier grade
features that protects and controls networks and users from spam and malware. This is
possible, in part, thanks to the filtering technologies in use, such as, but not limited to,
real time reputation analysis, heuristic analysis, anti-spoofing, and anti-phishing. Before
going into detail on how the system would work, first a short definition of Maltracker
and some recommendations in regards to APT detection are given, together with a new
approach proposed here for people mapping.
7For example: http://www.autoitscript.com/
8https://www.anubisnetworks.com/
9https://www.bitsighttech.com/
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Figure 5.1: Proposed framework to implement in AnubisNetworks
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Maltracker
Maltracker is a sandboxing platform for malware analysis, it is scalable and there-
fore suited to perform hundreds of analyses in parallel. The features include, but
are not limited to, static and behavioural analysis of files and URLs, anti-virus scan-
ning with third party software and detection of C&C communications. Although a
system like this is great in detecting the typical malware, like crypto blockers or
keyloggers, it would need changes to be able to detect the APT specific infection
vectors, such as extraction of password protected compressed files or the simulation
of user input at malicious webpages, like pressing a download button. One of the
problems consists on how the network is setup and how the analysis would be made
at the sandbox, since an exploit on application x version y running on operating sys-
tem z may not work in any other combination. There are, at least, two approaches to
this problem for heterogeneous or homogeneous networks. For the former, a brute
force approach would be taken, consisting on having the sandbox with several con-
figurations, operating systems, applications and respective versions, and executing
the analysis on all of them. Although this approach puts more strain on the over-
all system and delays the analysis, the administration will not need to employ strict
policies on systems or control user hosts, which in today’s ever changing landscape,
makes it the most viable option. Alternatively, an homogeneous network would al-
low for a smarter analysis on the sandbox by maintaining it and keeping it updated
just like the hosts in the network. A problem with this approach would be that if the
sandbox does not detect the attack, the attacker will have a way into any host in the
network.
People mapping
The outcome of this mapping is a list of pairs defined by a person and his or hers
correspondent mapping score. This mapping score will be obtained by understand-
ing:
a) what is their role and how important is it,
b) how long have they been in the company,
c) what information and/or systems they have access to,
d) how close are they to C-Levels (such as Chief Executive Officer),
e) how visible are they to the public (e.g. email address available on company
website or very detailed social network profiles; elaborate reconnaissance like
an adversary would),
f) how many e-mails they receive per day, and
g) how susceptible are they to phishing (perform mock phishing attacks and evalu-
ate results).
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These are some examples and depending on the company or its objectives, different
questions may be asked, but the idea remains the same, different people behave
differently online and by performing this kind of evaluation we improve the overall
system security performance. Instead of checking every single e-mail, we only
perform this detailed analysis on the addresses belonging to the people with the
highest scores, called the high priority list or HPL.
E-mail anomaly detector
Just like some of the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, this system would bene-
fit from email categorization. Specifically, after a learning phase for each user,
the system could categorize normal email traffic and raise alerts for abnormal be-
haviours, inbound or outbound. Besides looking at where the email came from it
would also be possible to look at the headers and understand if the mail is trace-
able and if the source is trusted, or to whom it is destined. For example, while it is
normal for someone in human resources to receive emails with attached files from
unknown addresses, maybe the same is not applicable to other employees. The ad-
dition of this system increases the overall security, since the adversary may target
personalities not present in the high priority list.
The proposed framework is shown in Figure 5.1. After deciding on who makes it to
the priority list and what defines an email as abnormal, the system is ready to go. We
propose three different ways of setting up the framework, detailed in Table 5.1. The
alternatives are based on which emails to check: every email (level 1), HPL personnel
together with suspicious emails (level 2) or just HPL personnel (level 3). We will detail
the Level 2 alternative for its balance of effectiveness and performance requirements.
The system would work as follows. After passing by MPS, if the email contains a link
or attachment, that was not already blacklisted, it is passed to our system:
• The recipient would then be checked against the High Priority List, and if a match
occurs the attachment and/or link are executed in the sandbox environment;
• If no match in the HPL occurs, the email is forwarded to the anomaly detector, and
if the message is categorized as abnormal it is sent to be thoroughly analysed in the
sandbox.
• This sandbox environment will then complete the analysis with one of the three
evaluations, clean, infected or abnormal;
• If the analysis is not able to conclude neither clean nor infected, the email is quaran-
tined and will await manual analysis (only the sandbox, when the email is evaluated
as clean, or the human analyst can authorize the final delivery of email);
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A system like this, just like all security mechanisms one can put in place, is not full-
proof. False-positives and negatives will happen, but we hope that with manual analysis
those numbers may remain low enough, so the system still remains a viable option. APTs
as we have seen, might represent one in a thousand emails, but if with this system we can
stop that email, stop an infection that would later lead to espionage or destruction, it is
worth the extra computational, personnel and timely costs.
E-mails checked Effectiveness Performance requirements
Level 1 High Priority List Average Low
Level 2 HPL+Abnormal emails Above average Medium
Level 3 All emails Maximum High
Table 5.1: Different uses of the framework depending on requirements
5.2.2 Other detection schemes
In this section we will take a closer look to the detection of an APT attack by focusing
on the four major attack steps proposed by ZScaler:
1) Reconnaissance,
2) Initial infection,
3) Control, and
4) Data exfiltration.
At each phase we will study how different detection schemes and mechanisms could
be used at the three proposed ”zoom-layers”, depicted in Figure 5.2, namely:
a) Internet,
b) Intranet, and
c) Host.
When we refer to the host we are referring to a machine, or set of machines, inside
the intranet, to which we have total access and control. The intranet is a controlled and
secure environment, in which we have access to all the information that enters and leaves
the network, and finally the demilitarized zone represents a set of machines open to the
internet, we still have control over them and access to the information but they are not as
secure since they are exposed to the dangers of the world wide web. At each layer we will
have access to different types of information, which allows us to predict better ongoing
attacks, or act upon them. We will discuss what could be done by different companies
with different services if they worked together as one, as well as some ideas that could be
applied in standalone.
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Figure 5.2: Zoom of proposed layers
1. Reconnaissance
(a) Internet: In this particular phase we can only look at the internet layer since
the adversary can gather all the information needed to carry out the attack with
no direct interaction with our infrastructure, which is called passive reconnais-
sance. We include in this layer servers and services in the demilitarized zone
of the network. Although we could be on the lookout for port scans, those have
become part of the internet and alone do not mean much. What we can do is
gather information from different events and correlate them within a certain
time frame. The events and correlations may then be used to predict malicious
activity. If social networking companies, search engines and e-mail providers
worked together with potential targets, a new range of options would become
available. For instance:
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• Company x detects a port scan within its servers,
• Search engine records exhaustive queries for a specific employee,
• Employee social networks are meticulously analysed, which is also recorded,
• Employee receives an uncommon e-mail with an attachment or link.
These steps would have been some of the events which triggered an alert in or-
der to prevent the next phase of the attack. This might seem like a big stretch,
but work has already been done in some of the points we expressed. For in-
stance, Allen et al. [5] provides us with a good example of what can be done to
detect active reconnaissance. Active reconnaissance makes use of techniques
which have direct contact with our servers, leaving us with some information
of the attackers intentions. By manually identifying characteristics in the gen-
erated traffic of well known reconnaissance tools, one can create specific rules
to block and/or alert administrators of an ongoing, or possible future, cyber at-
tack. Paradise et al. [107] did work on understanding machine operated social
network profiles, called social bots, used to gather information on the targeted
organization. They propose and evaluate monitoring strategies that focus on
detecting friend requests from social bots. To identify intruders, the authors
propose the use of manual inspection to determine if a friend request is legit-
imate, together with counter-intelligence investigation, such as a background
check on the requester profile. Because such approach would be infeasible on
every profile in the organization, a subset is chosen. The challenge is select-
ing a good subset. Following our proposed people mapping in the previous
section, one could use the list of high priority personnel as the chosen subset
or, as the authors proposed for future work, the use of honeypot profiles. We
can see how both works can be merged together with our proposed sandbox
email analysis to protect infrastructures even at the earliest phases of attacks.
A problem remains with the good identification of time-frames, that is, corre-
lating these events in a certain window of time making them relevant to our
defence. An email coming six months after a scan and a friend request in a so-
cial network might not be as relevant as an email delivered in the same week.
Other researchers look for alternatives, such as deception [118] by dropping,
delaying or modifying server and services responses, in order to stall the ad-
versaries reconnaissance.
(b) Intranet: It is important to note that we will not include insider threat re-
connaissance at this stage as we consider that to be part of the control phase,
since the attacker is already inside the network and has already acquired inside
knowledge.
(c) Host: Since there is no direct contact with internal hosts from the outside
world for reconnaissance purposes, we add nothing at this stage.
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2. Initial infection
(a) Internet: At this stage, two things can happen, either the victim clicks on a
malicious link or opens a malicious attachment. If the link is known to be
malicious it would be possible to re-direct the request to a safe location, for
instance at the Domain Name System level which is already done by some
Internet Service Providers and Public DNS servers. Since APT adversaries
know about these lists they register new unknown domains, sometimes target
specific, for their campaigns. As for the attachment, after successful infection,
the event to which we could pay attention is the initial communication to the
C&C, also called beaconing home. Unfortunately the traffic generated by
these events looks just as normal as any other traffic, whether it is encrypted
or not.
(b) Intranet: Besides being able to see the C&C beacon going out, at this stage we
actually have the attacker’s code. One of the most employed ways to prevent
initial infection is to run that code on controlled systems, such as the proposed
sandbox framework, which are usually appliances installed inside company
networks. The objective of this sandbox is to detect the malware before it is
delivered to the target and executed. Different malware might be able to detect
its analysis and halt or change the execution path, nevertheless the sandbox has
to be able to detect most of the malicious behaviours and block the infection.
(c) Host: This is possibly the best position for a defender to detect and neutral-
ize remote access trojans because the malware is built to remain persistent in
the host while having a numerous set of capabilities that either leave traces
in the logs or expose themselves with ”noisy” events. By using an agent at
each and every host in the network one could look for possible application
exploits, such as memory corruption or overflows, and malicious activity, like
the typical creation of registry key and start up process. These agents could
be: hardware based, small and simple so it would be possible to guarantee
its security and correctness, but could also be software based, following the
techniques employed by anti-virus, rootkit and exploit detectors. The major
advantage of a framework like this, is that the agent would be transparent to
the attacker and all the communication between the administrator node and
the agent would go unnoticed. This is important so that the attacker would
not ”panic-stop” the attack or delete its tracks. This agent would then be re-
sponsible for reporting those malicious events to the administrator node. An
example is shown in Figure 5.3, the idea is to block any further communi-
cation between the infected machine and the attacker while still keeping the
infection for analysis, classification and even attribution. Christodorescu et
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al. [25] showed us how virus scanners are susceptible to obfuscation employed
by malware writers since they are purely syntactic and ignore the semantics
of instructions, making them unreliable in detecting initial infection at the
host. They presented a malware detection algorithm that incorporates instruc-
tion semantics and proved its resilience to common obfuscation techniques.
Specifically, the authors contribute with a definition to determine malicious
behaviour, and although undecidable, it is capable of handling specific sets of
malware transformations. Future work should be done on defining APT spe-
cific behaviours that could be used by semantic based systems or help normal
virus scanners in detecting this specific threat. Josse [69] presents a frame-
work based on virtual environments and manual analysis to understand how
malware installs itself and maintains hooks within the target system. The tool
is designed for security analysts and the information is obtained by observing
the whole infected host from outside. At the same time, the analyst has the
possibility to interact with the virtual machine and dynamically drive the ex-
ecution of the malware, which is crucial for detecting custom and advanced
APT malware initial infection, obfuscation and encryption techniques.
Figure 5.3: Example of host agent communicating with its Master
3. Control
(a) Internet: This is where the botnet hunter companies shine by sink-holing do-
mains generated by a domain generation algorithm (DGA) and looking for
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botnet traffic. The difference is that the typical APT will not have hundreds of
thousands of infections. Instead, it will have relatively legitimate looking traf-
fic and will most likely not use DGAs. Some events one could look at would
be new domains with no reputation getting small amounts of traffic from only
one particular set of IP addresses, or the domain receiving several continuous
HTTP requests without a corresponding accessible web page.
(b) Intranet: By white listing domains, blocking certain protocols and making
use of detection systems, one could detect the communication between the in-
fected host and the adversary, usually by making use of the same techniques
employed by botnet masters. Although not APT specific, Gu et al. [57] gave us
an example of such detector. By focusing on the IDS-driven correlation with
the tracking of the two-way communication between internal hosts and ex-
ternal entities, the system develops an evidence trail that can later be matched
with an infection sequence model, including stages of the process such as mal-
ware download and outbound bot dialogue, and evaluated on their indicative
of a successful local host infection. Not only the system becomes ineffective
if encrypted communication channels for C&C are used, the authors admit
the impossibility to accurately detecting all steps. One remaining problem re-
lates to predicting the order and time-window in which the events are recorded
(a user may get infected and the first communication with the C&C happens
only after three months), which the system would no longer be able to cor-
relate. Gu continued his work [58] but now with a study on detecting botnet
C&C channels, at the network level, based on IRC and HTTP protocols with-
out any prior knowledge, such as signatures or binaries. Some of the problems
with detecting these behaviours include:
• Malware following normal protocol usage;
• Communication with low volume traffic;
• Only one infection in the network;
• The communication may be encrypted.
Because APT communications still make great use of the HTTP protocol, this
work has a particular interest to us. The authors observed that for HTTP-based
C&C, bots had a strong periodical visit pattern, but the detection system was
not as robust, or evasion-resilient, for a single client infection. For group in-
fections however, encrypting messages in HTTP was not a problem for the
correlation analysis, an improvement from previous work although the frame-
work is still vulnerable to exploitation of time windows. As we can see with
some of the work done in this field, the intranet is the best available choice to
detect C&C communication that could indicate possible infections. If it would
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also be possible to detect malicious activity inside the network, such as scans
or peer-to-peer communication, we would have the opportunity to pinpoint the
infected machine and act on it. By detecting the adversary lateral movement
we might be able to contain the infection and stop it from spreading.
(c) Host: It is also possible to detect at this level the unusual communication
between the attacker and the host itself by looking at new connections and
open sockets, as well as outgoing scans, but by being at the host, one level
deeper, we get access to new events. We are now able to detect administrator
abuse, such as log file deletion, execution of unknown software or the creation
of hidden files.
4. Data exfiltration
(a) Internet: Just like at the control phase, here we can look for connections being
established with unknown or abnormal addresses. The particularity of this
phase relies in the difference of the data size. Data exfiltration will send larger
communication packets to the C&C. This could be used to our advantage and
help us detect and block the exfiltration.
(b) Intranet: The main goal here is to detect confidential data exfiltration, which
is the most common objective in this type of attack. By looking at which in-
formation is leaving our network, how and to where is it going, we can stop
the exfiltration and alert administrators about the leak, who can then inves-
tigate the infected hosts. If the attacker does not encrypt or compress the
information, a digital watermark would be enough to detect the leak, the wa-
termarking should be detectable even if the leak is parted in clear format. If
encryption is used, one possible solution would be to use a proxy that would
preform a Man-in-the-Middle ”attack”, that is, either the information is deci-
phered at the proxy or it will not be allowed to leave the network. The same
rule would be applied to compressed files. This is possibly the best option to-
wards detecting encrypted exfiltration. Each host would have a cryptographic
key to encrypt data, and the proxy would then be responsible of decrypting
the information, check its legitimacy, encrypt it again, and send it to the fi-
nal destination with the corresponding agreed key. Liu et al. [90] did some
work in this field, particularly, they developed a multilevel framework capable
of application identification, content signature and covert channel detection.
The main challenge with such a framework is the detection of the informa-
tion leak despite the transformations used on the content, such as encryption,
compression or slight modifications. By relying on signatures representing
confidential information, a scalability problem arises, as the system is built
to deeply inspect packets, identify applications used, block clear information
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leaks and look for covert channels. The system can be used to detect most of
clear format data leaks, but results for compressed or encrypted data would be
slightly more interesting in regards to APTs. Al-Bataineh and White [4] did
work on detecting malicious data exfiltration making use of compression and
encryption. By using information entropy and byte frequency distribution on
the HTTP POST request contents together with information theory concepts
which measure randomness in content, the classifier is capable of detecting
encryption or compression where it is not expected to exist, making this event
an anomaly and a possible cause of further inspection. Although a step in the
right direction, the adversary would only need to use HTTPS communication
to evade such detection.
(c) Host: Since we could not be sure to detect this phase at the Intranet level, at
the host level, the agent would be able to detect the compression/encryption
of classified files, looking for example at unusually high CPU usages, and
corresponding exfiltration channels, such as external drives, cloud storage or
peer-to-peer connections, and act by blocking internet access or alerting the
administrators. This could be accomplished with the watermarking techniques
described above.
As we have seen, some of the proposed ideas already had some work done by other
researchers, but all of them are still open for large improvement. One of the conclusions
of this study relates to where and how one can better defend against the adversaries; one
can look at the internet to detect steps taken in the reconnaissance phase, at the host to
detect initial infection and at the Intranet to detect control and data exfiltration. This
is no surprise since each layer of defence has its own access to different events which
can lead to a better infection detection. As we have said previously, a system to detect
advanced threats would need to be a mixture of different components at different parts of
the network. Therefore, one could gather all of the work and ideas, improve them, and
create a system capable of better protecting the infrastructure by analysing information
from several layers.
5.3 What does the future hold?
Let us start by clearly stating, APT is the new normal. What was studied and pre-
sented about these threats, such as tactics, techniques and procedures, is currently being
used by criminal groups and nation states in their operations. This means that the industry
needs to be prepared for such threats starting from development [8], i.e., the basic assump-
tions regarding security need to be well defined and take into account the most advanced
adversaries. Although information and money are strong motivators behind these attacks,
Chapter 5. What to do against Advanced Persistent Threats 57
looking at the future one particular objective becomes a priority: the need for valid cer-
tificates. As anti-virus vendors and operating system creators consider a file to be secure
if it is signed with a valid digital certificate, attackers have everything to gain from com-
promising either a certificate authority [63] or the algorithms used during signing [54].
Both of these scenarios are worrying and certificate authorities need to be very careful
with their security, as well as with the certificates they sell. A certificate in the digital
world represents trust, so a certificate authority is basically selling trust, and the moment
they show they can not be trusted, they will surely suffer great losses, if not bankruptcy.
More on the topic, including methods of protection against illegitimately-correctly signed
software on [82].
Another evolving trend is the cyber-mercenaries for hire. These are the typical hack-
ers, that formed organized groups, learned the APT tactics and started selling them as a
service. When hired, they are given the target and objective. After conclusion they move
on to the next client and target. These are very skilled, lethal and low profile hackers. As
reported on [68]: ”they are rarely discovered [which] is due in part to their skill level and
in part to being misidentified as a state actor instead of a non-state actor if they are dis-
covered. The low risk of discovery, frequent misattribution to a nation state, and growing
demand of their services ensures that the EaaS10 threat actor will flourish”.
Following the previous problem, another interesting trend is related to specific infec-
tions being sold by botnet owners. If the worm used by the botnet master infects a certain
internet address owned by a high profile company, this infection can then be sold. After
purchase, they replace the malware with code of their own, technically more advanced
and stealthier. This will alter the behaviour of the machine and it might be perceptible
in the network logs. Nevertheless it is interesting how a common botnet infection can
become a successfully targeted espionage campaign. Hence the importance of detecting
even the most ”basic” botnet infections.
As the global number of mobile devices increases and their respective processing
power rises, these ”small PCs” that everyone carries in their pockets become an enticing
target for cyber-criminals. Specifically, with 283 million units shipped and over 84% of
the market share in the third quarter of 2014 [28], Android is the most wanted target.
Users are still not really interested in their mobile security. Symantec [116] reports on
the increasing trade-off between privacy and free apps. The average user will not even
worry about installing anti-virus software, while using the same device for home banking,
e-mail and surfing the web. Their inherent mobility and the user need to connect to any
available free Wi-Fi provides the adversary with a door into the target corporate networks.
Mobile application developers themselves may be targeted as a way to reach other specific
victims [127]. By infecting a developer of a popular application attackers not only get
access to source code and costumer data, they also gain the ability to issue an update
10Espionage-as-a-Service
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targeting specific individuals.
Going even further, to a distant future where e-mail protection systems are so perfect
that no malware gets by. With the ever increasing number of features in social network-
ing services combined with the relatively simple task of setting up a legitimately looking
profile and a little help of social engineering, attackers can easily focus on sending mali-
cious files via those services (Facebook, LinkedIn, Skype and others). And of course, old
espionage techniques are still valid [19].
Chapter 6
Future work and conclusions
6.1 Discussion and future work
With this work, we provide interested readers with a literature survey from which
we derived a definition of Advanced Persistent Threat, and we highlighted the reasons
that make this type of attacks different. We thoroughly examined its life-cycle, profiled
a typical adversary and discussed why current defence mechanisms fail to stop them.
Other researchers, or companies, can make use of this information when working on new
detection schemes, or on their new products. Another main contribution of this work
is a set of guidelines on what to do against these threats. More specifically, we leave
the blueprints on how a system could be implemented at AnubisNetworks to improve
detection of this type of attack campaigns, focusing on the e-mail infection vector, which
would result on an overall improvement of the service provided. We also discuss how
other companies or researchers can plan their products, or work, to face this threat at the
different layers of the network. One could follow up on the proposed ideas and base their
research on the related work we reviewed, or start a completely new work from scratch.
An important feature of such a system in order to detect or block these threats, is the need
to be built like a LEGO R© set, that is, the success of the system will depend on all the little
pieces put together at the different layers of the network. From detecting reconnaissance
steps and stopping initial infection to blocking data exfiltration, different phases of attack
require different systems to detect them.
As a consequence of the literature survey and the proposals within this work, some
topics for suture work arise naturally:
• Obviously the most obvious path to follow after this work would be to actually im-
plement the proposed blueprints at AnubisNetworks, and although we are sure that
a system like this would find success at the company, it is still a complex framework
with details that would take a lot of time and work to complete. Once the system
is online, we would then have to test it against real threats, specifically, evaluate
its performance in real scenarios, how many e-mails could the system handle ver-
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sus the amount of e-mails a high priority person receives, and based on those facts
refine the system;
• Understanding of what the network is doing that is normal and what is it doing that
can be said abnormal to help anomaly detection schemes in better characterizing
what an APT attack looks like in the network;
• Improving other current defence mechanisms, such as anti-virus or firewall solu-
tions, to better adapt in this threat landscape;
• Working on reducing the threat of the people vector with security awareness frame-
works or tools;
• Taking advantage of what we wrote about future attacks, one could also pick any of
the ideas proposed for APT detection and, together with the presented frameworks
in related literature, work on analysing, improving and setting them up for real
scenario testing.
6.2 Conclusion
What is an Advanced Persistent Threat? We looked at the problem following a sci-
entific perspective by first finding the source of the acronym and what it meant by then.
We saw how that meaning changed because of misinformation and we discussed an ap-
proach, closer to its origin, to look at the APT from a birds eye-view, not just by looking
at the malware perspective, but by looking at the attack campaign as a whole. Security
companies grabbed the term to describe sophisticated pieces of malware, but the truth
is not quite that simple. Highly organized groups with available resources were able to
successfully infiltrate high profile corporations with trivial, if not free and open source,
pieces of software.
We later showed how APTs are different from other threats and why they deserve to be
studied as such. We examined and critiqued one of the most used life-cycles when describ-
ing the typical APT steps and we also presented other life-cycles from different sources.
We concluded that a more representative model was necessary, hence we contributed with
a novel APT representation that improves the understanding of how complex, organized,
resourceful and tenacious are these adversaries. These were later characterized using a
list of features, together with the information we gathered, that will help readers under-
stand with greater depth who is behind these attacks, what are their backgrounds and
what is their level of expertise. Another problem we encountered and showed why it still
persists, is the lack of functional and effective defences against these threats. As most
security schemes still rely on detecting known threats, and anomaly detection lacks on
consistency, by knowing this adversaries exploit current frameworks at their most basic
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assumptions, making use of encryption, polymorphism and other techniques. One con-
clusion is clear, security systems need to adapt and change their assumptions overtime on
what a successful attack is.
A big problem we encountered while developing this work was the lack of data re-
garding APT attacks. Statistics were usually focused on the companies targeted and on
the information stolen. We went looking for information regarding the actual attacks, that
is, how was the payload delivered, what applications did they targeted and what was the
adversaries goal. To fix this lack of literature, we set out to look at the available reports,
unfortunately not that many, on discovered APT attacks, and evaluated if they could be
classified as APTs. The results were presented here in a summarised fashion with cri-
tiques of our own.
Throughout the work we realized that being ready for APT attacks is not all about
detection and reaction, but also about prevention and being proactive. We shared the
knowledge we built on how one should prepare itself and its systems for these kind of
attack before moving on to detection frameworks. The main proposed framework, to be
used at AnubisNetworks, would be a great line of defence against APTs, specifically be-
cause attackers still make great use of the e-mail vector to deliver their malicious content,
which is also the main focus of the company. Obviously, the system will never be perfect,
but it will be a step in the right direction to block the threat before any person has a chance
to download a malicious payload. The framework focuses on two points:
• First, and for performance reasons, the need to select which e-mails will be checked,
a process we called people mapping. The idea is to really understand which people
have access to certain resources, how much of a danger they are to the company,
and reflect that into the mapping score;
• The second point consists in the integration of the people mapping, the e-mail filter-
ing already in place at AnubisNetworks and a recently developed sandbox system
called Maltracker. By presenting a framework capable of merging all these tools to-
gether, after implementation and refinement, one could expect to have higher prob-
ability of blocking both commodity threats, such as ransom ware or new botnet
instances, and more stealthy ones, typical of APTs.
We later took a more scientific approach, hoping to help future research and engineer-
ing projects in the field, to the problem of APT detection, and discussed how one could
build systems at the different levels of abstraction in the several layers of a typical enter-
prise network by using some of the related work. From the reconnaissance phase to the
data exfiltration, by the internet or at the host, we studied what could be done and which
work has already been conducted that could be improved. Finally, we concluded our work
by trying to predict how the threat landscape will shape itself up in the upcoming years,
how attackers will adapt, how their tools will evolve and what their goals will be.
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